Volume 74
Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 74,
1969-1970
6-1-1970

Recent Cases

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Recent Cases, 74 DICK. L. REV. 750 (1970).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol74/iss4/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

Recent Cases

CONFESSION OF JUDGMENTS-REFUSAL OF
NEW YORK STATE TO ENFORCE
PENNSYLVANIA COGNOVIT
JUDGMENTS

Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303

N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969).
In Atlas Credit Corporation v. Ezrine1 the Supreme Court,

Special Term, New York County denied Atlas's motion for summary judgment to enforce two Pennsylvania judgments obtained
under warrant of attorney. The Supreme Court Appellate Division
unanimously reversed holding that the Pennsylvania judgments
were not subject to attack. 2 The Court of Appeals of New York
reversed the appellate court holding that Pennsylvania cognovit
judgments, not being judgments in fact, would not be enforced in
New York State. Further, it held that a warrant of attorney
which allowed confession of judgment anywhere in the world
without notice violated due process depriving the Pennsylvania
court of jurisdiction.3
Defendants, Ivan Ezrine, Sarah Ezrine, and others, executed
a mortgage guarantee agreement containing a clause warranting
any attorney to confess judgment against them in any court of
1. Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969) (4-2 decision).
2. Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 31 A.D.2d 532, 295 N.Y.S.2d 215 (App.
Div. 1968) (per curiam), rev'd, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d
382 (1969) (4-2 decision).
3. Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969) (4-2 decision).
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record. Upon claimed default, judgment was entered against defendants by an attorney pursuant to the warrant of attorney. Defendants did not receive notice or service. Thereafter, partial satisfaction of the judgments were obtained at public sheriff's sales
with Atlas as the purchaser. Since real estate was included in the
purchases Atlas proceeded with a fair value proceeding in order
to recover the balance of the judgment. Defendants did not receive personal service of this action. Service was, however, effectively given under the Pennsylvania statute 4 with defendants receiving actual notice. Defendants did not attend the fair value
hearing and judgments were entered for the balance of the debt.
Ivan A. Ezrine later specially appeared and moved to open judgment upon essentially the same grounds later pleaded in the New
York Courts. The petition to open the judgment was denied in
Pennsylvania. Atlas then brought suit in the New York courts to
enforce the Pennsylvania judgments against defendants who were
5
New York residents.
Confessions of judgment entered upon warrants of attorney in
advance of suit are not enforceable in most states. Pennsylvania,
Illinois and Ohio are the only states that specifically allow cognovit
judgments without restriction.6 In these states they are used as a
security device and
have found some acceptance through extended
7
use by creditors.
Cognovit judgments have been the subject of many articles8
with the general consensus that they are repugnant to our system
4.
5.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2621.4 (1967).
25 N.Y.2d at 221, 250 N.E.2d at 476-78, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 385-87.

6.

Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process

and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. Cm. L. REV. 111, 131 (1961).
However,
as of January 1, 1970 Pennsylvania has imposed some procedural changes,
see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2950-75 (Sept. 1969 Cum. Pamphlet). See
also Amram and Schulman, Pending Pennsylvania Supreme Court RulesThe New Rules on Confession of Judgment, 41 PA. BAR ASS'N QTR. 6
(1969).
The proposed UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.415 would
eliminate the use of warrants of attorney in confessions of judgment. For a
list of statutes by states see Comment, Abolition of The Confession of

Judgment Note In Retail Installment Sales Contracts in Pennsylvania, 71
Dicx. L. REV. 115, 125 (1968).
7. See Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. Cm. L. REV. 111, 114-15 (1961).

8.

See, e.g., Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of

Due Process and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 111

(1961);

Hunter, The Warrant of Attorney to Confess Judgment, 8 OHIO ST. L.J. 1
(1941); Klein, The Entry of Judgment by Confession on Promissory Notes,
32 DICK. L. REV. 191 (1928); Shuchman, Confession of Judgment as a Conflict of Laws Problem, 36 NOTRE DAME LAW. 461 (1961); Tanner, Uni-

formity of Judgment Notes in Pennsylvania, 44 Dicx. L. REV. 173 (1940);

of justice and fair play. It has been stated that: "The signing of a
warrant of attorney is equivalent to a warrior of old entering a
combat by discarding his shield and breaking his sword." 9 Despite
the distaste for cognovit judgments, they have been held to be
entitled to full faith and credit if valid in the state rendering them.
Full faith and credit would not be given, however, if the rendering
court could be shown to lack jurisdiction. 10
12
Atlas Credit Corporation v. Ezrine" is a novel decision.

It

not only attacks the Pennsylvania court's jurisdiction for lack of
due process, but also bases its ruling upon the theory that a cognovit
judgment is not actually a judgment and is therefore not entitled
to full faith and credit.
The court in Atlas, in reaching its decision on full faith and
credit, reviews the area of the law and notes that the only two
United States Supreme Court cases"8 involving cognovit judgments
have denied them full faith and credit. Both of these decisions
were based upon lack of jurisdiction of the rendering court for
failure to strictly observe the terms of the warrant of attorney.
The prior law in New York, presented in the leading case of Teel
v. Yost, 14 was that a ". . . [cognovit judgment] constituted a
judgment within the meaning of the acts of Congress requiring full
faith and credit to be given to it in other states."' 5 Atlas speAbolition of the Confession of Judgment Note in Retail Installment Sales
Contracts in Pennsylvania, 71 DICK. L .REv. 115 (1968); Confession of

Judgment-Warrantof Attorney-A Return to the Writ, 1 DUQUESNE U.L.
REv. 239 (1963); Full Faith and Credit for Judgments Confessed by Attorney, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1275 (1931); Confession of Judgment and Time
Certainty in a Negotiable Instrument, 46 ILL. L. REV. 642 (1952); Cognovit
Notes in Indiana, 21 NOTRE DAME LAW. 187 (1946); Resort to the Legal
Process in Collecting Debts from High Risk Credit Buyers in Los AngelesAlternative Methods for Allocating Present Costs, 114 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 879
(1967); Confession of Judgment, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 524 (1954). See also
Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 1232 (1952); Annot., 40 A.L.R. 441 (1926), supplemented by Annot., 89 A.L.R. 1503 (1934).
9. Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 4, 97 A.2d 234, 236 (1953).
10. Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 1232 (1955); 47 AM. JuR. Judgments § 1280
(1969).
11. Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969).
12. But see Rosen v. Albert, 165 N.E.2d 844 (Ct. C.P. Ohio 1960)
(holding that a warrant to confess judgment at any court of record was
void for uncertainty); accord, Henry Bierce Co. v. Hunt, 170 So. 2d 99
(Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1964).
13. National Exch. Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257 (1904); Grover & Baker
Sewing Mach. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890).
14. Teel v. Yost, 128 N.Y. 387, 28 N.E. 353 (1891), overruled, Atlas
Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 483, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382,
394 (1969).
15.

Id. at 393, 28 N.E. at 354.

But see Baldwin Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v.

Klien, 136 Misc. 752, 240 N.Y.S. 804, af 'd, 230 App. Div. 830, 244 N.Y.S. 899
(1930) (App. Div.) (holding that a Pennsylvania cognovit judgment was
not valid against a person who is a New York resident at the time of confession), overruled, Morris v. Douglass, 237 App. Div. 747, 262 N.Y.S. 712
(1933) (App. Div.).
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cifically overruled Teel v. Yost.16 In overruling Teel, Atlas
states: "[C]ognovit judgments may not be enforced in the courts
17
of this State."'
The United States Constitution states: "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
Judicial Proceedings of every other State ..
"Is Atlas noted,
however, that "although it is traditional to refer to a 'judgment'
when discussing questions of full faith and credit, the word 'judgment' is not used in the clause itself."'1 The court therefore concluded that a judgment need not necessarily be entitled to full faith
and credit unless it was a judicial proceeding. Pennsylvania provides for a cognovit judgment on a warrant of attorney to be entered before a prothonotary or officer of the court. 20 Atlas held
that this Pennsylvania procedure is a ministerial act and not a
21
judicial proceeding.
Atlas, however, does not base its decision solely on the distinction between judicial proceeding and judgment. A judgment,
according to Atlas, requires that matters be submitted to a court
for decision. Since the cognovit judgment is only entered mechanically rather than submitted to a court for decision, Atlas holds that
it is not a "judgment in fact." 22 Thus, Atlas avoided the United
States Supreme Court ruling that local policy is not a defense to
2
distasteful sister state judgments. 1
The majority in Atlas held that cognovit judgments are repugnant to New York local policy. Since the court need not apply
full faith and credit to the Pennsylvania judgment and local policy
prevails, cognovit judgments would not be enforced in New
York.2 4 The dissent believes that the Pennsylvania judgments are
due full faith and credit and also, while admitting that New York
does not have warrants of attorney and requires other limitations
on confession of judgment, that the difference between the two
states is more formal than real. 25 This is the same position taken in
Teel v. Yost. 26 The question of local policy being a state matter,
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

25 N.Y.2d at 228, 250 N.E.2d at 483, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
Id. at 226, 250 N.E.2d at 481, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
U.S. CONSr. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
25 N.Y.2d at 225, 250 N.E.2d at 480, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (Supp. 1969).
25 N.Y.2d at 226, 250 N.E.2d at 481, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
Id. at 226, 250 N.E.2d at 481, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
25 N.Y.2d at 226, 250 N.E.2d at 481, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
Id. at 229, 250 N.E.d at 484, 303 N.Y.S.d at 395.
Teel v. Yost, 128 N.Y. 387, 403 28 N.E. 353, 358 (1891), overruled,

however, appears to be settled.
The Atlas court presented a second reason why they
would not
enforce Pennsylvania cognovit judgments. Attacking the Pennsylvania court's jurisdiction, Atlas held that the warrant of attorney to
confess judgment anywhere in the world without notice was void
for uncertainty. Any action under it, therefore, violated due process depriving the rendering court of jurisdiction. 2 The dissent
points out that it makes little difference where judgment is entered.28 The defendant has already confessed judgment and lost
29
his day in court.
By basing its decision upon both the lack of any need to extend
full faith and credit to cognovit "judgments" and the lack of due
process in the non-notice provision of such judgments, Atlas raised
two constitutional grounds to strike down cognovit judgments.
Under full faith and credit cognovit judgments can still exist but
will not be enforced in New York. This certainly will restrict their
use but will not eliminate them in other states. If Atlas is appealed to the United States Supreme Court and upheld cognovit
judgments could still exist intrastate and be enforced in other
sister states where it is not against local policy. An upholding
of the lack of due process argument by the United States Supreme
Court, however, would have a much broader effect. It would eliminate cognovit judgments, although still allowing other types of
confession of judgment. These questions, however, may become
moot since the constitutionality of the confession of judgment
laws of Pennsylvania are currently being challenged in federal
courts.3 0
A leading article on cognovit judgments states:
Some state supreme court must now take the first step and
declare a non-notice cognovit judgment unconstitutional.
Then the United States Supreme Court would have a
chance to affirm."
Atlas has taken the first step in holding that the Pennsylvania
cognovit judgment allowing a warrant of attorney to confess judgment anywhere in the world without notice violated due process.
Atlas Credit Corp. V. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 228, 250 N.E.2d 474, 483, 303
N.Y.S.2d 382, 394 (1969).
27. 25 N.Y.2d at 227, 250 N.E.2d at 482-83, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
28. Id. at 228, 250 N.E.2d at 482-83, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
29. See, Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment of wages statute was held to lack due process
since it was the taking of property without notice and a prior hearing).
But see American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932) (holding
that: "Due process requires that there be an opportunity to present every
available defense, but it need not be before the entry of judgment.");
accord, Philips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
30. See Swarb v. Lennox, Civil No. 69-2981 (E.D. Pa. filed Dec. 23,

1969).

31. Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process
and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 11 (1961).
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The second step depends on Atlas Credit Corporation, who must
decide whether to appeal the New York court's decision.
Atlas is significant in that it reflects the growing trend of the
courts in becoming consumer oriented. This trend is important
if the consumer's unequal bargaining position in the economy is
to be remedied.
HERMAN RICHARD AGLER

EPILOGUE
During the publication stages of this Recent Case Note, the
Federal District Court entered its decision in Swarb v. Lennox,
, 1970) (mentioned at text acCivil No. 69-2981 (E.D. Pa., June
companying note 30 supra). The three-judge district court decided
that confession of judgment clauses in leases and consumer financing transactions are invalid as against residents of Pennsylvania
having incomes of less than $10,000 per year. The court stated that
the Pennsylvania procedure used for entry of confession of judgments which is based on the concept of a waiver of notice without
adequate understanding by the debtor violates the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although the decision severely
restricts the use of confession of judgment clauses in Pennsylvania,
it does not eliminate them. Their constitutionality, therefore, remains subject to challenge.

FELONY MURDER-FELON NOT RESPONSIBLE
FOR ACCIDENTAL DEATH OF BYSTANDER
SHOT BY POLICE

Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550
(1970).
In Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers' the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reconsidered its holding in Commonwealth v. Almeida.2 Almeida held that a felon could be convicted of murder
in the first degree for the death of a bystander shot by police attempting to capture the fleeing felons. The Smith court expressly
overruled Alemida holding that rational application of the felony
murder rule would not permit the law to hold a felon responsible
for the accidental death of a person caused by someone acting in
resistance to the felony.
The facts of Smith are the same as the operative facts of
Almeida. Both cases stem from the robbery of a Philadelphia
grocery by relator James Smith, David Almeida and Edward
Hough. On January 30, 1947 the trio first robbed a public garage,
stole a car and drove to a supermarket. Almeida and Hough went
inside the store; Smith remained behind the wheel of the getaway
car. Shortly after the felons arrived at the supermarket, Cecil
Ingling, an off-duty Philadelphia police officer, and his family arrived at the scene. As Hough and Almeida ran from the supermarket two police cars arrived at the scene and a gun fight followed. Ingling returned to the scene and received a fatal head
wound when he attempted to capture Hough. Hough was captured shortly after the gunfight. Hough entered a plea of guilty
to the charge of murder, and was subsequently adjudged guilty
of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death. Almeida and
Smith were apprehended approximately one year later and returned to Pennsylvania for trial.8
Almeida was found guilty of murder in the first degree and
sentenced to death. Smith was tried about two weeks later. At
Smith's trial, the fact that officer Ingling may have been killed by
1. 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970).
2. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 924, rehearing
denied, 339 U.S. 950 (1950).
3. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 220, 261 A.2d
550, 551 (1970). For a complete statement of the facts see Commonwealth
ex rel. Hough v. Maroney, 425 Pa. 411, 412-16, 229 A.2d 913, 914-15 (1967).
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one of the arresting officers was brought to light for the first
time. 4 The trial court charged the jury that it was irrelevant who
fired the fatal bullet:
Even if you should find from the evidence that Ingling
was killed by a bullet from the gun of one of the policemen,
that policeman having shot at the felons in an attempt to
prevent the robbery or the escape of the robbers, or to protect Ingling, the felons would be guilty of murder, or if
the fire of the felons that was
they did that in returning
5
directed toward them.
The jury convicted Smith of first degree murder and his punishment was fixed at life imprisonment. Smith failed to file any
post-trial motions, take an appeal, or initiate any post-conviction
proceedings, despite what the majority opinion of the court termed
"the litigious propensities of his co-felons, '"' until February 4, 1966
when he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.
In his petition Smith contended that he had been denied both
his right to appeal and his right to the assistance of counsel on appeal from his conviction. He also maintained that the trial court's
charge to the jury, that he could be convicted regardless of who
shot Ingling, deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial.
The lower court denied his petition. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reversed, granted the writ of habeas corpus, allowed an
7
appeal nunc pro tunc and granted Smith a new trial.
4. Commonwealth ex rel. Hough v. Maroney, 425 Pa. 411, 415, 229
A.2d 913, 914 (1967).
5. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 220, 261 A.2d
550, 551 (1970).
6. Id. at 220, 261 A.2d at 550. For the many appeals and post conviction motions of co-felons Almeida and Hough, see: United States ex rel.
Hough v. Maroney, 247 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (writ granted); United
States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 104 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (writ
granted), aff'd, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904, rehearing denied, 345 U.S. 946 (1953); Commonwealth ex rel. Hough v. Maroney, 425 Pa. 411, 229 A.2d 913 (1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Almeida v.
Rundle, 409 Pa. 460, 187 A.2d 266 (1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 815
(1963); Commonwealth ex rel. Hough v. Maroney, 402 Pa. 371, 167 A.2d 303
(1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 961 (1961); Commonwealth ex rel. Almeida v.
Baldi (361 Misc., Docket No. 9)(1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 867 (1950);
Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 924, rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950); Commonwealth v.
Hough, 358 Pa. 247, 56 A.2d 84 (1948).
7. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 221, 261 A.2d
550, 552 (1970). Although Smith's appeal was based on the failure of
the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division to grant his
writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court elected to treat the matter as a
direct appeal, under its decision in Commonwealth v. Gist, 433 Pa. 101,
249 A.2d 351 (1969). Smith was granted the appeal nunc pro tunc on the
ground that he was not aware of his right to appeal from the conviction or

The common law doctrine of felony murder was firmly entrenched in the Commonwealth long before Almeida.8 Under the
felony murder rule when one person kills another in the perpetration of a common law felony, the element of legal malice is supplied
to the homicide so as to make the killing murder.9 Thus, even
an unintentional or accidental homicide by the felon in the commission or attempt to commit a felony, such as rape, robbery, or
burglary, was murder,'0 The theory was that the initial felonious
act or intent was sufficient to supply the state of mind known as
malice which was essential to constitute murder. "The malice of
the initial offense attaches to whatever else the criminal may do in
connection therewith."" Some courts suggest that the purpose of
the felony murder rule is to provide a measure of protection to the
citizens and community by acting as a deterrent to those felons
who may negligently or accidentally kill. 12 Another very reasonthat he failed to appeal because he was fearful of receiving the death penalty on retrial. The court did not decide the factual issue of why he
failed to appeal, but found that under either reason Smith did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal.
8. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 50 A.2d 328
(1947); Commonwealth v. Pepperman, 353 Pa. 373, 45 A.2d 35 (1946);
Commonwealth v. Elliot, 349 Pa. 488, 37 A.2d 582 (1944); Commonwealth
v. Frisbie, 342 Pa. 177, 20 A.2d 285 (1941); Commonwealth v. Guida, 341
Pa. 305, 19 A.2d 98 (1941); Commonwealth v. Kelly, 333 Pa. 280, 4 A.2d
805 (1939); Commonwealth v. Stelma, 327 Pa. 317, 192 A. 906 (1937); Commonwealth v. Bruno, 316 Pa. 394, 175 A. 518 (1934); Commonwealth v.
Sterling, 314 Pa. 76, 170 A. 258 (1934); Commonwealth v. Crow, 303 Pa. 91,
154 A. 283 (1931); Commonwealth v. Flood, 302 Pa. 190, 153 A. 152 (1930);
Commonwealth v. Tauza, 300 Pa. 375, 150 A.649 (1930); Commonwealth v.
Doris, 287 Pa. 547, 135 A. 313 (1926); Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 282 Pa.
128, 127 A. 465 (1925); Commonwealth v. McManus, 282 Pa. 25, 127 A. 316
(1925); Commonwealth v. Carelli, 281 Pa. 602, 127 A. 305 (1925); Commonwealth v. Lessner, 274 Pa. 108, 118 A. 24 (1922); Commonwealth v.
Grether, 204 Pa. 203, 53 A. 753 (1902); Commonwealth v. Major, 198 Pa.
290, 47 A. 741 (1901); Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 8 W. & S. 415 (Pa. 1844).
9. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simpson, 436 Pa. 459, 260 A.2d 751
(1970); Commonwealth v. Cater, 396 Pa. 172, 152 A.2d 259 (1959); Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958); Commonwealth v.
Guida, 341 Pa. 305, 19 A.2d 98 (1941). As the court observed in Simpson:
The distinguishing criterion or hallmark of murder is legal
malice, express or implied. Malice is an absolutely essential ingredient of murder ....

If a person kills another in the perpetra-

tion of a felony, such as robbery, then the commission of the felony
imbuses the killing with the required element of malice thereby
making the killing murder. The malice of the initial offense attaches to whatever else the criminal may do in connection therewith.
Commonwealth v. Simpson, 436 Pa. 459, 463, 260 A.2d 751, 754 (1970).
10. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kelly, 333 Pa. 280, 4 A.2d 805 (1939);
Commonwealth v. Hall, 328 Pa. 493, 196 A. 16 (1938); Commonwealth v.
Stelma, 327 Pa. 317, 192 A. 906 (1937); Commonwealth v. Harris, 314 Pa.
81, 171 A. 279 (1934); Commonwealth v. Lessner, 274 Pa. 108, 118 A. 24
(1922); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 266 Pa. 223, 109 A. 878 (1920);
Commonwealth v. Exler, 243 Pa. 155, 89 A. 968 (1914).
11. Commonwealth v. Guida, 341 Pa. 305, 308, 19 A.2d 98, 100
(1941).
12. See, e.g., People v. Cline, 270 A.C.A. 359, 360, 75 Cal. Rptr. 459,

460 (1969); Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 8 W. &S. 415 (Pa. 1844).
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able theory is that at early common law nearly all felonies were
punishable by death, hence, it was immaterial whether a man was
hung for stealing a loaf of bread or for accidentally killing the baker
while trying to steal the bread.' 3 In either case, the limited purpose of the felony murder rule was to furnish the mens rea of
murder. To establish a defendant's guilt for murder it was only
necessary to establish that he had committed a homicide while engaged in a felony. It was not necessary to introduce any other
evidence to prove the essential element of malice aforethought,
14
necessary to raise the homicide to murder in the first degree.
The common law felony murder doctrine is now regulated by
statute in Pennsylvania, as it is in most other states. 15 The
Pennsylvania Penal Code provides:
All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of
poison, or by lying in wait, or by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing or which shall be committed in the perpetration of; or attempting to perpetrate
any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or kidnapping shall
be murder in the first degree. All other kinds of murder
shall be murder in the second degree.'6
As Smith notes, the statutory felony murder rule merely raises
certain murders to murder in the first degree.' 7 The statute
does not define murder; for that it is again necessary to turn to the
common law. Murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a hu-

13. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 494, 137 A.2d 472,
476 (1958); Hitchler, The Killer and His Victim in Felony Murder Cases,
53 DiCK L. REV. (1948).
14. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 209 N.E.2d
308 (1965); People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 167 N.E.2d 736, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328
(1960). As Professor Morris observed:
[I]f the death occurs in the course of certain felonies . . . the
particular malice required for murder will be held to exist. The
accused in these cases will be treated as if the particular type of
malice required for murder existed ....
The felony murder rule
is thus a rule for establishing the mens rea of murder; it is not a
rule of causation; it does not bear upon the actus reus of homicide.
Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA.
L. REV. 50, 59 (1956).
15. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.010 (1962); Amr. REV. STAT. § 13452 (1956); D.C. Cons ANN. § 22-2401 (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101
(1969); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 748-1 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1
(Smith-Hurd 1964); IOwA CODE A.N. § 690-2 (Supp. 1970); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:30 (1951); MASS. GN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 1 (1959); MicH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.316 (1968).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963).
17. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 224, 261 A.2d
550, 553 (1970).

man being with malice aforethought, express or implied.' 8 Malice
is a state or frame of mind; it is present not only where a particular
ill will exists, but in every case where there is a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences,
or a mind barren of social duty.19 "The distinguishing criterion
'2 0
of murder is malice aforethought.
Prior to the decision of Commonwealth v. Almeida,21 the felony murder rule was uniformly applied to impute malice to the
actions of a felon, where malice did not expressly exist. There
were, however, some limitations on the application of the doctrine.
Since it was not the act of killing which was being imputed to the
felon, but rather the malice flowing from his initial felony, it was
necessary to prove that the homicide was committed during the
commission or attempted commission of another
felony. As the
22
court later said in Commonwealth v. Redline:
In adjudging a felony-murder, it is to be remembered
at all times that the thing which is imputed to a felon for
a killing incidental to his felony is malice and not the act
of killing. The mere coincidence of homicide and felony is
not enough to satisfy the requirements of the felony
murder doctrine. It is necessary to show that the conduct
causing death was
done in furtherance of the design to com23
mit the felony.
The application of the felony murder rule was well described by
Mr. Justice Parker in Commonwealth v. Guida,24 and appeared to
be the settled law of Pennsylvania. 25 To bring a homicide within
18. Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 15 (1868), accord, Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 293 Pa. 218, 221, 142 A. 213, 215 (1928).
19. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Malone, 354 Pa. 180, 47 A.2d 445, 447
(1946); Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 293 Pa. 218, 221, 142 A. 213, 215
(1928).
20. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 493, 137 A.2d 472, 475
(1958). See also IV BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES "198.
21. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
22. 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
23. Id. at 495, 137 A.2d at 476 (emphasis in original).
24. 341 Pa. 305, 19 A.2d 98 (1941). Mr. Justice Parker states:
[I]f a person killed another in doing or attempting to do another
act, and if the act done or attempted to be done was a felony, the
killing was murder. There was thus supplied the state of mind
called malice which was essential to constitute murder. The malice
of the initial offense attached to whatever else the criminal may
do in connection therewith.
Id. at 308, 19 A.2d at 100.
25. See cases cited note 8 supra and accompanying text. A review of
the cases establishes that the killing must have been done by the felon
or a co-felon. In instances where there was a conflict of the evidence as
to whether the decedent was shot by the felon or a third party acting in
resistance to the felony, it appears that convictions were sustained only
when the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the decedent was shot
by the felon or co-felon. See. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 321 Pa. 327,
184 A. 97 (1936); Commonwealth v. Mellor, 294 Pa. 339, 144 A. 534 (1928).
But see, Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947). In
Moyer the trial court told the jury that the defendants could be convicted

Recent Cases
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

the scope of the felony murder rule it was necessary to establish a
killing by the felon himself or by a co-felon, since under the coconspirator's rule the acts of one principal which are in furtherance of the common, unlawful design are attributed to each of
26
the accomplices.
In 1949, the court announced its decision in Commonwealth v.
Almeida.27 Defendant Almeida appealed his conviction of murder
in the first degree on the ground that the trial court's charge to
the jury was incorrect. 28 The court denied Almeida's contention.
By adopting a proximate cause concept of criminal responsibility
the court found that Almeida's conviction was justified under the
felony murder rule.29 Almeida was not consistent with prior
Pennsylvania decisions, and its description as "a radical departure
from common law criminal jurisprudence" 0 is fully warranted.
The Almeida court appeared to lose sight of the fact that the
felony murder rule is a mere doctrine to obviate the necessity of
estabishing malice aforethought by other means. It is not a docunder the felony murder rule even if the fatal shot was fired by the intended victim. Redline characterized this statement as a "palpable gratuity" since the judge in Moyer instructed the jury to acquit the felon unless
the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the felons
had fired the fatal bullet, Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 497, 505, 137
A.2d 472, 481 (1958). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438
Pa. 218, 229, 261 A.2d 550, 555 (1970).
26. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Melton, 406 Pa. 343, 178 A.2d 728
(1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 851 (1962); Commonwealth v. Dickerson,
406 Pa. 102, 176 A.2d 421 (1962); Commonwealth v. Coleman, 402 Pa. 238,
166 A.2d 525 (1961); Commonwealth v. DeMoss, 401 Pa. 395, 165 A.2d 14
(1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 822 (1961); Commonwealth v. Lowry, 374
Pa. 594, 98 A.2d 733 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 914 (1954); Commonwealth ex rel. Moszczynski v. Ashe, 343 Pa. 102, 21 A.2d 920 (1941); Commonwealth v. Crow, 303 Pa. 91, 154 A. 283 (1931); Commonwealth v.
Guida, 298 Pa. 370, 148 A. 501 (1930); Commonwealth v. Davis, 287 Pa. 547,
135 A. 313 (1926); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. 640, 61 A. 246 (1905);
Commonwealth v. Biddle, 200 Pa. 642, 50 A. 262 (1901); Weston v. Commonwealth, 111 Pa. 251, 2 A. 191 (1886).
27. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
28. The charge was as follows:
If that fatal shot were fired by anyone, even anyone removed from
these three participants, and that shot was fired in the perpetration of a robbery, members of the jury, that is murder; that is
murder in the first degree.
Id. at 601, 68 A.2d at 598. At one point when addressing himself to a
request by counsel during closing argument the trial court judge said:
"[I] will rule it out, and I will charge the jury that it makes no difference
who fired the shot, even if a shot was fired by Mrs. Ingling, it was still
murder. Id. at 601, 68 A.2d at 598.
29. Id. at 634, 68 A.2d at 614.
30. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 489-90, 137 A.2d 472, 473
(1958).

trine of causation, but serves only to supply the requisite mens rea
of murder, 81 not the actus reus. Under the felony murder rule, it
is not any homicide that the felon is held responsible for, but any
murder committed in the commission of certain felonies.
[T]he malice necessary to make a killing, even an accidental one, murder, is constructively inferred from the
malice incident to the perpetration of the initial felony.32
In Commonwealth v. Thomas,3 3 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court continued to apply its proximate cause theory of felony
murder. The court was faced with deciding whether a co-felon
could be found guilty of the murder of another felon shot by the
victim of the armed robbery. The majority held that the killing
could be imputed to the surviving felon because the death was a
natural foreseeable result of the initial act of robbery:
That the victim, or any third person such as an officer,
would attempt to prevent the robbery or to prevent the
escape of the felons and would shoot and kill one of the
felons was as readily foreseeable as the cases where an
innocent bystander is killed, even unintentionally by the
defendant's accomplice, or where the victim
of the robbery
is slain or where a pursuing ofifcer is killed.3 4
The felony murder proximate cause theory was finally abrogated in Commonwealth v. Redline3 5 In considering the identical
issue raised in Thomas, the court held that a felon could not be
convicted of murder for the death of a co-felon shot by police.
Redline expressly repudiated Thomas but did not overrule Almeida.
The court distinguished justifiable homicide, which occurs when a
policeman shoots an escaping felon, from the accidental death of an
innocent bystander, which would only be an excusable homicide,3 6
holding that a felon was still criminally responsible for the latter
killing.
A basic weakness of Almeida is its application of the tort concept of proximate cause to the causation of the actus reus. The
purpose of a felony murder rule is to supply malice, not a theory
of causation. In People v. Washington,7 the defendant was convicted of murder for participating in a robbery in which his accomplice was killed by the victim of the robbery. In reversing the
31. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550
(1970).
32. Id. at 225, 261 A.2d at 553.
33. 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).
34. Id. at 644, 117 A.2d at 206.
35. 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).

36.

A justifiable homicide is a killing either by command of the law

or with the permission of the law (execution of a convicted criminal,
apprehension of a fleeing felon). Excusable homicide is a killing by misadventure, per infortunium or in self-defense, se defendendo, IV BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *178-186. In neither case is the actual killer held
criminally responsible for the death, id.
37. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
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conviction, the California Supreme Court underscored the basic
fallacy of Almeida:
When a killing is not committed by a robber or by his
accomplice but by his victim, malice aforethought is not
attributable to the robber, for the killing is not committed
by him in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate robbery. It is not enough that the killing was a risk reasonably to be foreseen and that the robbery might38 therefore
be regarded as the proximate cause of the killing.

The court specifically rejected any distinction based on the status
of the person killed. 9
A second and major fault of Almeida is that a defendant could
be convicted of murder in the first degree, not for his own actions,
but for the response of his victim or some other party to the
robbery. Until Almeida, in order to convict for felony-murder it
was necessary to establish that the killing was done either by the
accused or by a co-felon acting in furtherance of the felonious undertaking. 40 In the landmark case of Commonwealth v. Campbell,41 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected the
contentions of the Commonwealth, that a rioter could be convicted
of manslaughter regardless of whether the fatal shot was fired
by a rioter or a soldier attempting to quell the riot, and held:
No person can be held guilty of homicide unless the
act is either actually or constructively his, and it cannot
be his act in either sense unless committed by his own hand
or by some one acting in concert with
him or in further42
ance of a common object or purpose.
The court noted that the rule of criminal agency or co-conspirator's
rule is subject to one limitation. The act must be done "for the
furtherance or in the prosecution of the common object and design
for which they combined together." 43 The general rule of Campbell
is now widely followed. 44 Logic required its application to Al38. Id. at 780, 402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
39. A distinction based on the person killed, however, would
make the defendant's criminal liability turn upon the marksmanship of victims and policemen. A rule of law cannot reasonably
be based on such a fortuitous circumstance.
Id. at 779, 402 P.2d at 132, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
40. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
41. 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541 (1863).
42. Id. at 543.
43. Id. at 544.
44. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44
Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965); Butter v. People, 125 Ill.
641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888);
Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905); State v. Garner,
238 La. 563, 115 So. 2d 855 (1959); Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505,
209 N.E.2d 308 (1965); People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 167 N.E.2d 736, 201
N.Y.S.2d 328 (1960); State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568 (1968).

meida. The police officers were not acting in concert with Smith,
Almeida and Hough. The officers were attempting to thwart the
robbery and were not acting in furtherance of a common object or
purpose with the fleeing felons.
The decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers45 reflects a general discontent
46
Most Ameriwith the harsh principles of the felony murder rule.
can jurisdictions are now attempting to confine its application to
reasonable bounds. Smith removes the artificial concept created by
Almeida and imposes the reasonable limitation that the victim in
a felony murder must be killed by the felon or a co-felon. A charge
to the jury that the felon may be convicted under the felony
murder rule, even if the victim was killed by police attempting
to capture the fleeing felon, denies the felon a fair trial. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court gave "Almeida burial, taking it out
47
of its limbo and plunging it downward in the bowels of the earth."
ROBERT P. BARBAROWICZ

45. 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970).
46. See, e.g., People v. Cline, 270 A.C.A. 359, 75 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1969);
People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 414 P.2d 353, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1966).
See also J. HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMANAL LAW 280 (2d ed. 1960).
47. Commonwealth ex Tel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 237, 261
The quote refers to Chief Justice Bell's lament in
A.2d 550, 560 (1970).
his dissent in Redline. Chief Justice Bell decried that Redline left the
ruling of Almeida, "like Mohammed's coffin . . . suspended between Heaven and earth. However, unlike Mohammed's coffin, which is headed upward toward Heaven, the coffin containing Commonwealth v. Almeida is
pointed downward in preparation for a speedy flight into the bowels of the
earth." Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 548 n.14, 137 A.2d 472,
499 n.14 (1958) (dissenting opinion). Chief Justice Bell filed the lone dissent in Smith.

WILLS-THE DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY DEVISED
TO A PREDECEASED TESTATRIX
"OR HER ESTATE"

In re Estate of Braman, 435 Pa. 573, 258 A.2d 492 (1969).

Mrs. Ruth G. Braman died testate, survived by her spinster
sister Mary Goddard. Mrs. Braman's will gave a life interest in
her entire residuary estate to her sister, with the provision that
upon her sister's death, the residuary estate was to be distributed
among specified charities and friends. Miss Goddard's will gave
her entire residuary estate to Mrs. Braman "or her etate." Upon
Miss Goddard's death, the assets of her estate went into the corpus
of Mrs. Braman's estate. The court of common pleas of Centre
County decided that the residuary clause of Mrs. Braman's will
effectively passed these after-acquired assets to her testamentary
heirs, the specified charities and friends.' This decision was appealed by the sole intestate heir of both sisters, a first cousin.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, with three justices dissenting,
held that the after-acquired property in Mrs. Braman's estate
passed to her intestate heir.2
The first basis for the court's decision was that Mrs. Braman
had no legal or equitable interest during her lifetime in anything
she might inherit under her sister's will. Therefore, she could not
devise by her own will what amounted to a mere contingency.3
The second basis for the court's decision was that there was not
sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that Miss Goddard, at the
time she executed her will, intended to have her estate pass under
the terms of Mrs. Braman's will.4 It should be noted that the
assets in which Miss Goddard had a life estate passed without
question to Mrs. Braman's testamentary heirs upon Miss Goddard's
death. The dispute in this case concerned assets which Miss
Goddard owned without reference to any life estate created by
Mrs. Braman's will.
Miss Goddard's will was written on July 15, 1938, twenty-three
years prior to the execution of Mrs. Braman's will. Mrs. Braman
died on March 13, 1963 at the age of eighty-six. Miss Goddard died
on February 25, 1964 at the age of eighty-five. Miss Goddard was a
1. 5 CENTRE COUNTY L.J. 127 (1968).
2. In re Estate of Braman, 435 Pa. 573, 258 A.2d 492 (1969).

3. Id. at 581, 258 A.2d at 496.
4. Id. at 581, 258 A.2d at 496.

guest at a rest home for elderly people from June 13, 1961 until the
date of her death. An inference might arise that Miss Goddard did
not know of her sister's death, for although she survived her sister
by almost a year, she failed to substitute another name for that of
Mrs. Braman as executor of her will. Both sisters had the same
intestate heir, a first cousin who was the exceptant-appellant in
this case. Neither sister included appellant as an heir in any portion of her will.
This was a case of first impression in Pennsylvania. The first
issue was whether a testator could devise after-acquired property.
The court realized that a will should not be construed to result in
intestacy if the same can be avoided. 5 The purpose of a residuary
clause is to pass the whole estate and to avoid an intestacy. 6 The
court's duty is to accomplish that result if possible.' A general
residuary clause includes every known or unknown interest unless
such interest is clearly excluded.8
The court stated that these principles would not apply unless
the testatrix, at the time of her death, actually had an interest
recognized in law or equity as opposed to a mere expectancy in
property. Mrs. Braman "simply had an expectancy that, if she
survived her sister, she would receive the residuary estate."9 An
expectancy ".

.

. is the chance of obtaining property by inheritance

or by will from a person now living. Such chances are not in themselves rights in property."' 0
Mrs. Braman's will had to be construed as if it had been executed immediately before her death, 1 ' when she had only an expectancy in her sister's estate. 12 Pennsylvania law requires that
wills be construed as of the time of death.
(1) Wills construed as if executed immediately before
death. Every will should be construed as to real and personal estate, to speak and take effect as if it had been
executed immediately before the death of the testator.13
5. Carmany Estate, 357 Pa. 296, 53 A.2d 731 (1947); Bricker's Estate,
335 Pa. 300, 6 A.2d 905 (1939); Buechley's Estate, 283 Pa. 107, 128 A. 730
(1925); Biles v. Biles, 281 Pa. 565, 127 A. 235 (1924); Fuller's Estate, 225
Pa. 626, 74 A. 623 (1909).
6. Fuller's Estate, 225 Pa. 626, 74 A. 623 (1909).
7. Id.
8. Ingham's Estate, 315 Pa. 293, 172 A. 662 (1934).
9. In re Estate of Braman, 435 Pa. 573, 575, 258 A.2d 492, 493 (1969).
10. 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1618A (rev. ed. 1936).
11. See, e.g., Farmers Trust Co. v. Wilson, 361 Pa. 43, 63 A.2d 14
(1949); 96 C.J.S. Wills § 229 (1949):
In the absence of controlling words to the contrary, the residue
distributable under the residuary clause must be determined as of
the date of the death of the testator in the light of the knowledge
relating to the estate which is acquired by his executors subsequent to his death. ...
Id. (footnotes omitted).
12. In re Estate of Braman, 435 Pa. 573, 576, 258 A.2d 492, 494 (1969).
13. PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 20, § 180.14 (1953).
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Therefore, Mrs. Braman's will could not transmit the after-acquired property in question. A person cannot make "a postmortem
disposition of property which at the time of his death he does not
own or in which he has no right."'1 4 This rule is the first basis for
5
the decision in Braman. It is supported by the Restatement,' other
authorities,' 6 and the few cases which have considered the ques14. In re Estate of Braman, 435 Pa. 573, 577, 258 A.2d 492, 494 (1969).
15. The applicable section of the Restatement is as follows:
. . . if the testator has not yet died, a legatee named in his will has
no interest in the testator's property, even though the testator is
unlikely to change his will and even though he is hopelessly
insane so that he be unable to change his will.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 86, comment a at 244 (1959).
16. See, e.g., 1 W. PACE, PACE ON WILLS § 16.2 (Bowe-Parker rev.
1965):
A legatee who dies before the testator cannot devise or bequeath property which he would have taken under the will of
such testator if he had outlived him. The same is true in the case
of a prospective heir who predeceases the ancestor from whom he
would have inherited. In both cases, the legatee and heir had a
mere expectancy prior to the testator's and ancestor's death, and if
such expectancy does not materialize into fulfillment, it never becomes a vested interest that can be passed by a will.
*
Rights which arise at or after testator's death and which never
belonged to him during his life. .. cannot be bequeathed.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The author further states:
A mere possibility is said not to be devisable, and this is
undoubtedly true if the term "mere possibility" is restricted in its
meaning to "an expectancy, which is specifically applied to a mere
hope of succession unfounded in any limitation, provision, trust, or
legal act whatsoever." During the lifetime of the ancestor, the
hope of the prospective heir of succeeding to the ancestor's estate is
a mere possibility or expectancy which is not subject to devise;
and the hope of one who is named beneficiary in the will of another of succeeding to such beneficial interest is such a mere possibility that it cannot be devised. Upon the ancestor's death, however, the expectancy is transformed into a vested interest, assuming
the heir is still living. . . . The rule that an expectancy or possibility cannot be devised pertains only to the situation in which the
heir or beneficiary predeceases the ancestor or testator or for some
other reason the expectancy fails to materialize by the time the
heir or beneficiary dies.
Id. at § 16.17 (footnotes omitted); G. THOMPSON, WILLS, § 40 (3d ed. 1947):
"A person cannot make a testamentary disposition of property which does
not belong to him at the time of his death." Id. (footnote omitted); 96
C.J.S. Wills, § 751 (1957):
It is presumed that a testator intended to dispose only of property which he owned, unless the language of the will, or the circumstances of the case as shown by proper evidence, indicate
otherwise. So, the will should not be given the construction that
the testator intended to dispose of property not owned by him
unless the language he used conclusively evidences such a purpose,
or is open to, or fairly susceptible of, no other construction.
Id. (footnotes omitted). A later section states: "The test of the power of
a residuary clause to carry property is whether the property belonged to
the testator, and not whether he knew that it was his. . . . Id. at § 799

tion.17 "The lack of case law on this subject may well be attributed
to a general recognition that a testator cannot dispose of property
in which at the time of his death he has neither ownership nor
interest of any kind."' 8
The second basis for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding
was expressed as follows:
Moreover, we fail to find within the four corners of
Miss Goddard's will any intention on her part that her
assets were to be distributed in accordance with the terms
of decedent's will, a will about which, so far as this record shows, she had no knowledge. Miss Goddard's will
was written twenty-three years prior to the execution of
decedent's will. If we are to maintain the integrity of
our case law that the intentions of a testator are to be
determined from circumstances existing at the time of the
execution of the will (Lewis Estate, 407 Pa. 518, 180 A.2d
919 (1962); Woodward Estate, 407 Pa. 638, 182 A.2d 732
(1962), then we must conclude that the circumstances existing when Miss Goddard drew her will do not reflect any
intention to provide for ultimate disposition of her property, under the testamentary scheme of decedent's will. 19
There were few facts in the record relating to this issue, probably
because the lower court "did not bottom its decision on any intent
to be found either in Miss Goddard's will or that of decedent." 20
Implicit in the Braman decision is the reasoning that if the
facts indicated that Miss Goddard intended, at the time she made
(footnotes omitted). But see 4 W. PAGE, PAGE ON WILLS § 33.50 (BoweParker rev. 1965):
Unless a contrary intention appears from the will, its effect is not
limited to property in which testator has an interest in possession,
but includes property in which he has interests in expectancy.
Id. (footnote omitted). This text doesn't define "interests in expectancy,"
but the sense of the entire sentence and the supporting cases cited by the
author make it apparent that the situation referred to is one in which the
testator does not have a present right to possession and the right to possession is the "interest in expectancy" to which the author refers. Several of
the cases referred to are: Biggerstaff v. Van Pelt, 207 Ill. 611, 69 N.E. 804
(1904); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Alfred University, 339 Mass.
82, 157 N.E.2d 662 (1959); First Nat. Exchange Bank v. Seaboard Citizens
Nat. Bank, 200 Va. 681, 107 S.E.2d 408 (1959).
17. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. McGee, 131 Md. 156, 101 A. 682 (1917).
This case involved the application of a Maryland statute. The statute provided that a bequest to one dying before the testator should not lapse, but
should have the same effect to transfer the right, estate, and interest
mentioned in the bequest as if the legatee had survived the testator. The
court held that a legatee who died before the testator could not bequeath
what he would have received under the testator's will had he survived him.
The bequest would not pass as assets to the legatee's executor or administrator, but would go to his heirs or next of kin. The court said the reason
for this was that a testator could not devise or bequeath something in
which he had no interest at the time of his death. A testator's will takes
effect at the time of his death.
18. In re Estate of Braman, 435 Pa. 573, 579, 258 A.2d 492, 495 (1969).
19. Id. at 581, 258 A.2d at 496.
20. Id. at 580, 258 A.2d at 496.
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her will, to have her estate pass under the terms of Mrs. Braman's
will, then it would be so allowed.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court referred to two cases as authority for the proposition that a testator's intent must be determined at the time of the execution of the will.2 1 These cases were
22
concerned with what passed under the will. In Lewis Estate
the court considered the question of whether the term "money"
as used in a holographic will included stocks and bonds. In Woodward Estate23 the testatrix executed a will which bequeathed shares
of stock to two legatees. The stock split before the death of the
testatrix. The testatrix failed to amend her will to reflect the
stock split. The question before the court was whether the new
shares passed to the legatees. Although Braman was concerned
with the question of to whom disputed property passed, and the
two above cases were concerned with what property passed, the
rule that a testator's intent must be determined at the time of
execution of the will is applicable to both situations.
According to Braman, regardless of the evidence reflecting
Miss Goddard's intent at the time of her death, the assets would
still pass to Mrs. Braman's intestate heirs.24 This occurs because
Miss Goddard executed her will twenty-three years before Mrs.
Braman executed hers, and it would be extremely unlikely that
evidence could be found showing that Miss Goddard had any
future will of Mrs. Braman in mind when she executed her will.
Miss Goddard's actions or declarations after Mrs. Braman's death,
even if she were shown to be cognizant of the terms of Mrs.
Braman's will, would be of no effect unless she executed another
will or a codicil to her 1938 will.
The question arises as to what the outcome of the Braman
decision would have been if the court had been willing to infer
Miss Goddard's intent at the time of her death, or if Miss Goddard
had executed her will after Mrs. Braman's death. Because of the
conflicting inferences 25 in the factual setting the court could have
held either way.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 581, 258 A.2d at 496.
407 Pa. 518, 180 A.2d 919 (1962).
407 Pa. 638, 182 A.2d 732 (1962).
In re Estate of Braman, 435 Pa. 573, 581, 258 A.2d 492, 496 (1969).

25.

Miss Goddard lived for almost a year after inheriting a life estate

from her sister, and yet she never replaced her sister's name as executor

in her will. Throughout this time Miss Goddard resided in a rest home for
elderly people. This could provide an inference that she knew the terms
of Mrs. Braman's will. It could also provide an inference that she didn't

even know of her sister's death.

Some courts have allowed an intention to transfer assets under
the terms of a predeceased testator's will to be inferred where a
surviving testator simply knew of the terms of a predeceased
testator's will. 26 "In a number of cases it has been held that under
A's bequest or devise of property to B's estate, the property must
be distributed according to the terms of B's will or, in the case of
B's intestacy, to B's heirs. '27 The cases to which this statement
refers are all cases in which it could be inferred that the surviving
testator intended that his estate's assets should pass under the will
28
of a predeceased testator.
In Leary v. Liberty Trust Company 29 the testator bequeathed
$15,000 in trust for the benefit of his brother Robert for life and on
the death of Robert the fund was to go to his brother James if then
living. In the event of James' death it was to go to James' estate.
James predeceased the testator by two years and upon the testator's death the court held that the trust fund was distributable
under James' will The court reached its decision because the testator was presumed to have knowledge of the contents of James'
will. He had such knowledge because he was one of the executors
of James' will. This should be compared with Braman, in which
Miss Goddard lived for almost a year after inheriting a life estate
under Mrs. Braman's will. The result in Leary was reached even
though the testator made his will before the death of James and
before he gained any knowledge of the terms of James' will. Implicit in this decision is the court's presumption that upon learning
of the contents of James' will the testator adopted its terms by not
changing his own will.
In Bottomly v. Bottomly 3o the testator, a bachelor, was predeceased by one of his nephews. The testator was an executor and
trustee of the estate of the predeceased nephew, and was constantly
solicitous of the welfare of the nephew's widow and children. The
widow and children were the chief beneficiaries of the trust created
by the nephew's will. The testator devised part of his estate to
"the estate of" the predeceased nephew. On a bill to construe the
court held that the words "the estate of" described the trust mentioned in the nephew's will.3 1 The court considered the entire
factual situation to warrant a finding that such was the testator's
intention.3 2 Of course, the facts in Bottomly provide a much
stronger inference of intent than those of Braman.
26. See, e.g., Leary v. Liberty Trust Co., 272 Mass. 1, 171 N.E. 828
(1930).
27. Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 483, 492 (1966).
28. See, e.g., Cumming v. Cumming, 219 Ga. 655, 135 S.E.2d 402
(1964); Leary v. Liberty Trust Co., 272 Mass. 1, 171 N.E. 828 (1930); Arnett v. Fairmont Trust Co., 70 W. Va. 296, 73 S.E. 930 (1912).
29. 272 Mass. 1, 171 N.E. 828 (1930).
30. 134 N.J. Eq. 279, 35 A.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
31. Id. at 296, 35 A.2d at 484.
32. Id. at 296, 35 A.2d at 484.
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Leary, Bottomly, and cases of like import 33 present the following rule of law: If an intent can be found, from all the surrounding
facts, that a testator desired his estate to pass under the will of a
predeceased testator, that result should be accomplished. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided as a matter of law that the
facts at the time of the execution of Miss Goddard's will did not
34
show such an intent on her part.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Braman decision was
correct in a technical legal sense. There should be no fear that it
will encourage a great increase in will contests brought about by
uncertainty as to what types of after-acquired property can be
devised. It should not be difficult for the court to determine
whether a testator had a legal or equitable interest in such property
before his death. Also, this decision does not go against that portion of the Wills Act which validates bequests to a trust "established in writing by the testator or any other person before of
concurrenty with the execution of such will, or to a trust to be established, in writing, at a future date. . .. -35 It does not go
against the Wills Act because if a testator, at the time of the execution of his will, sufficiently states his intention that such bequests
should pass to such a trust, they will be so allowed.36
The Braman decision may best serve as a caveat to attorneys
to avoid imprecise drafting and to testators to change their wills
as their expressed intentions change.
LARRY FOLMAR

33. See, e.g., Cumming v. Cumming, 219 Ga. 655, 135 S.E.2d 402
(1964); Arnett v. Fairmont Trust Co., 70 W. Va. 296, 73 S.E. 930 (1912).
34. In re Estate of Braman, 435 Pa. 573, 258 A.2d 492 (1969).
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14a (Supp. 1967).
36. In re Estate of Braman, 435 Pa. 573, 581, 258 A.2d 492, 496 (1969).

ABORTION LAW-CALIFORNIA
ABORTION LAW VOIDED

Cal. 2d
People v. Belous,
(1969), cert. denied, U.S.

, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354
(1970).

In People v. Belous,' the California Supreme Court invalidated
an abortion statute which made it a crime to procure the miscarriage of a woman unless necessary to save her life. 2 The court held

that the only constitutionally acceptable construction of the statute
would be a relative safety test which would balance the risk of
death from abortion against the risk of death from childbirth.
The court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional because this test could not be reasonably construed from the statutory words, "unless necessary to preserve the life."3
Doctor Belous, a physician and surgeon in the field of Gynecology, was convicted under this abortion statute. Cheryl, who
was unmarried, pregnant and emotionally upset, had come to Doctor Belous for help. She had threatened to seek an illegal abortion in Tijuana if no help was forthcoming. Doctor Belous pro-

vided her with the name of Lairtus, a skilled abortionist. Lairtus
was subsequently arrested by the police, who discovered evidence indicating that Doctor Belous had referred several women
to Lairtus for abortions. Lairtus testified that he had split fees
with Doctor Belous as a professional courtesy in about half the
instances when he had treated a patient referred to him by
Doctor Belous. Doctor Belous denied receiving money from Lairtus. Doctor Belous further stated that he had provided Cheryl with
Lairtus' number because he feared that she would seek an illegal

abortion in Tijuana under substandard medical conditions, thereby
placing her life in grave danger.

This conduct, he contended,

brought him within the scope of the statutory justification, "unless
necessary to preserve the life."

The decision has little statewide significance since California
Cal. 2d
, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied,
1.
(1970).
U.S.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West 1955).
3. Id. The statute provides that:
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to any woman,
or procures any woman to take any medicine, drug, or substance,
or uses or employs any instrument or other means whatever,
with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of a woman, unless
the same is necessary to preserve her life, is punishable by imprisonment ....
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has since enacted a therapeutic abortion law. 4 This law authorizes
abortions that take place in accredited hospitals, and which are approved by a hospital staff consisting of at least three physicians.
In addition, there must be a substantial risk that the pregnancy
would gravely impair the physical and mental health of the mother.
This statute would likely meet the test enunciated in Belous.
Though of limited importance in California, the Belous decision
has considerable national significance since it appears to be the
first decision to declare an abortion statute unconstitutional. The
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have abortion statutes similar to California's which make the preservation of the woman's
life the sole justification for an abortion. 5 A minority of states
amended their statutes to permit an abortion in order to preserve
tahe health, as well as the life of the mother. 6 Massachusetts
achieved a similar result through judicial construction of the term,
"lawful abortion."' 7 Hawaii recently enacted a law allowing a
woman to decide for herself whether she may have an abortion.8
The abortion statutes of all but a few states would be struck down
if the Belous holding were adopted by the courts of these jurisdictions.
The Belous court found that the statute failed to sufficiently
4.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§

25950-54 (West Supp. 1968).

5. ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.060 (1962); AmIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-211
(1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-29 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.10,
797.01 (1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-601 (1948); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38,
§ 23-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-105 (1965); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 701.1 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-410 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 436.020 (1962); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 51 (1965); MICH. COMP.
ANN. § 750.14 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.18 (1964); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 2223 (1957), as amended, Miss. LAWS, ch. 358 (1966); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 559.100 (1949); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-401 (1947); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 28-404, 405 (1956); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.120 (1963); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 585.13 (1955); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-25-01 (1960); O-o REV.
CODE ANN. § 2901.16 (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 861 (1967);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-3-1 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-82 (1962); S.D.
CODE § 13.31.01 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-301 (1955); TEX. PEN. CODE
ANN. art. 1191

(1961);

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-1

(1953); VT. STAT. ANN.

tit. 13, § 101 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 5923-18.1-62 (1960); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.02.010 (1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5923 (1961); Wis. STAT. § 940.04
(1963); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-77 (1959).
6. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1958); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 40-50 (Supp.
1967); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1201,03 (1969
rev. Crim. Code); MD.CODE art. 43, § 149(c) (Supp. 1953); N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 14-45 (Supp. 1967).
7. Comm. v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 53 N.E.2d 4 (1944).
8.

The law is not presently in print.

see N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1970, at 1, col. 5.

For a report on the new law

fulfill any compelling state interest to justify a curtailment of
two fundamental rights of the woman: the right to life and the
right to decide for herself whether to bear children. The court
based its holding on three grounds: (1) The statute could not be
upheld on the valid purpose of protecting the health of the woman,
since under modern medical conditions it no longer served this purpose; (2) The state had failed to demonstrate a sufficient interest
in the fetus to warrant a risk to the life of the mother; (3) The
statute was void for vagueness.
The Belous court noted that at the time of enactment of the
state's first abortion law in 1872, any abortion statute placed the
life and health of the woman in jeopardy and was thereby more
hazardous than childbirth.9 This was because the state of medical technology at that time made surgery of any kind an alternative
tive which would be acceptable only in the face of near certain
death.10 Modern medical advances have transformed abortions
performed early in pregnancy into comparatively harmless operations." The risk of childbirth, in many instances, has become a
graver threat to the woman's life than that of an abortion. 12 The
statute has come to frustrate the very objective for which it was
designed, hence, it can no longer be justified on the ground that it
protects the woman's interest.
The court observed that a statute which prohibited an abortion only when the danger to the woman from such an operation
was greater than the risk inherent in childbirth would fulfill the
valid state objective of protecting the health of the woman. The
argument advanced by the court appears to be in harmony with
the reasoning expressed by the United States Supreme Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut. 3 Griswold declared invalid a statute
which banned the use of contraceptives. The Court asserted that
the statute encroached upon a fundamental right of privacy in matters of marital intimacy which would only be permissible pursuant
to a valid state objective.' 4 The state contended that the purpose
9.
Cal. 2d
,458 P.2d at
,80 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
10. Id. at
,458 P.2d at
,80 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
11. Id. at
,458 P.2d at
,80 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
12. Id. at
,458 P.2d at
,80 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61.
13. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. The United States Supreme Court has had several other occasions
to rule upon matters related to sex and marriage. See Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Court voided a statute banning interracial marriages
because it was based on an unconstitutional classification, hence violative
of the fourteenth amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(The Court struck down a statute which provided for sterilization of
habitual criminals on the grounds that it made an unconstitutional distinction between certain types of criminals. The court noted that when
an important right, such as the right to reproduce, is being abridged the
statute must apply equally to all within the purpose of the statute, and
there was no valid basis for making a distinction between the genes of an
embezzler and those of a larcenist); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)
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of the statute was to discourage marital infidelity. The Court agreed
that the purpose was valid, but that a general ban on contraceptives, which took into its sweep contraceptives employed within the
marriage union, was unnecessary to accomplish the valid state interest. Griswold noted that this interest could be achieved by a
more narrowly drawn statute.'0 Belous concluded that insofar
as the interest sought to be protected was that of the woman, the
only exception permitted by the statute, the necessity of preserving the life of the woman, did not lend itself to a constitutionally

permissible interpretation.
The court next examined whether the state had a sufficient
interest in the fetus to justify the restriction upon the rights of the

woman. The court had ample grounds for finding that the sole
legislative purpose was the protection of the woman; that there
was no legislative intent to confer a legal status upon the fetus
before quickening.'6
At common law it was not an offense to

perform an abortion until quickening had taken place. 1"

It was

not until the 19th century that statutes were enacted which abolished this common law right. 1 8 There are only two authorities

from this period which shed light on the legislative intent in
prohibiting abortion from the time of conception.' 9 These are the
New York Reviser's Report of 1828,20 which laid the foundation
for the enactment of the first such statute in New York and a
(Court upheld a statute providing for the sterilization of mental incompetents on the basis of a valid public purpose).
15. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 498, 506 (1965).
16. Quickening has been defined as the movement of the fetus within
the mother's womb. See Hunter v. State, 29 Ga. App. 366, 115 S.E. 277
(1923); State v. Patterson, 105 Kan. 807, 181 P. 609 (1919) (quickening
deemed to occur about middle of pregnancy); State v. Steadmen, 214 S.C. 1,
51 S.E.2d 91 (1948).
17. Smith v. Gafford, 31 Ala. 45 (1857); Eggert v. Florida, 40 Fla. 527,
25 So. 144 (1898); State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho, 599, 64 P. 1014 (1900); Abrams
v. Fushes, 3 Iowa 274 (1856); Mitchell v. Comm., 78 Ky. 204 (1879); Comm.
v. Bangs, 9 Mass. 387 (1912); Edwards v. State, 79 Neb. 251, 112 N.W. 611
(1907); State v. Tipple, 89 Ohio St. 35 (1913); Grey v. State, 77 Tex. Crim.
221 (1911); Miller v. Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 56 S.E.2d 217 (1949); Contra,
Mills v. Comm., 13 Pa. 631 (1850); State v. Slagle, 83 N.C. 630 (1880). Both
of these decisions found the offense to be the means employed against nature to thwart the public policy of population growth. Neither case was
based upon an interest in the life of the fetus.
18. See Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement
and Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C. L. REV. 731-32
(1968).
19. See Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the
Status of the Fetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality,
14 N.Y.L. FORUM 506 (1968).
20. 6 R.visoRs NOTES, Pt. IV, tit. 6, §§ 9, 21, 28 (1828).

New Jersey judicial decision. 21 Both these sources state that the
purpose of these statutes in their respective states was to protect
the health and the life of the woman. In further support of this
contention, Belous reviewed a series of decisions from courts of
other jurisdictions concerning the legal status of the unborn child,
and from these decisions the court concluded that the law reflects
22
only the interest of the live child or the parent.
The view enunciated by Justice Holmes in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton23 was that the fetus has no cause of action for
damages inflicted upon it in the womb, since a fetus is nothing
more than a vegetating part of the mother to whom no separate
legal duties are owed. This view was widely accepted by the
courts 24 until 1945, when Bonbrest v. Kotz 25 allowed recovery for
prenatal injuries. In 1949 the Ohio Supreme Court permitted recovery on the grounds that the viable fetus was a person within
the meaning of the Ohio constitution.26 Today most jurisdictions
permit recovery for injuries to a viable fetus 27 and many of these

courts have extended the actionable period to the moment of conception. 28 All courts require the child to be born alive in order to
maintain an action, 29 but Beious was incorrect in concluding
that this necessarily reflected a judicial intent to withhold a legal
status from the fetus. There are unique problems associated
with an attempt by the estate of a stillborn child to recover damages
for his wrongful death. These include conflicting interpretations
21. State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112, 114-15 (Sup. Ct. 1858) ("The design of the statute was not to prevent the procuring of abortions, so much
as to guard the health and life of the mother against the consequences of

such attempts.")

22. People v. Belous,
Cal. 2d
n.12, 458 P.2d 194, 202-203,
n.12, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362-63, n.12 (1969) citing: Scott v. McPheeters,
33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 93 P.2d 562 (1939); Tomlin v. Laws, 301 Ill. 616, 134
N.E. 24 (1922); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964).
23. 138 Mass. 14 (1864).
24. See 4 RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 869 (1939). See also Newman v.
Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Buel v. United Ry. Co., 248 Mo.
126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913); Berlin v. J.C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28
(1940); Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W.
916 (1916).
25. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
26. Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d
334 (1949) (OHIo CONST. art. 1, § 16 provides that the courts be open to
"every person, for any injury done him.")
27. See, e.g., Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Sup. 242,
111 A.2d 633 (1955); Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953);
Mitchell v. Couch, 385 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. App. 1955); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); LaBlue v. Specker, 358 Mich. 558,
100 N.W.2d 445 (1967); Rainy v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1950);
Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957).
28. Tucker v. Howard Carmichael & Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909
(1951); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Woods v. Lancet,
303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690,
291 P.2d 225 (1955); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960);
Seattle-First Nat. Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288, 367 P.2d 271 (1962).
29. 2 F. HARUER & F. JAMES, TORTS, § 18-3 (1956).
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of the legislative intent behind the enactment of wrongful death
statutes, speculation on the amount of damages, and difficulty of
proof of causation.3 0 Several courts have based their holdings
permitting recovery for prenatal injury upon the belief that advances in medical knowledge have demonstrated that the unborn
child is a separate biological entity apart from the mother from
the time of conception." In Raleigh Fitkin Paul Morgan Memorial
Hospital v. Anderson,32 one of the rare decisions which consciously
balanced the rights of the fetus against those of the mother, the
New Jersey Supreme Court required a woman to submit to a blood
transfusion because her unborn child's right to life was superior
to her right to practice religion.3 3 It can be concluded that current case law reflects a judicial uncertainty concerning the legal
status of the unborn child.
This background provides an appropriate context in which to
place the court's discussion of the state's interest in the fetus. Unfortunately, Belous did not sufficiently clarify the scope of its
holding that the state lacked a compelling interest in the life of
the unborn child. Presumably, the court was merely attempting
to refute the contention that the state had intended to confer a
right to life upon the unborn child. So limited, legal authority
substantiates the Belous holding. The California statute and similar statutes in many other states were enacted during the 19th
century. The then prevailing view was that the fetus was only a
vegetating part of the mother.3 4 It would be unreasonable to infer
an intent to grant a creature, so regarded at that time, a human
status in the absence of a clear expression of such an intent.
Whether Belous intended, however, to confine their holding
to refuting the contention that the state had intended to confer a
right to life upon the unborn child remains uncertain. The court's
language on the legal status of the unborn child suggests that it
may have been contemplating a more radical doctrine; that the
30.

2 F.

HARPER

& F.

JAMES,

TORTS,

§ 18-3

(1956);

W.

PROSSER,

LAW OF TORTS, § 56 (3d ed. 1964).
31. See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946)
("from the viewpoint of the civil law and the law of property, a child
en ventre sa mere is not only regarded as a human being, but as such from
the moment of conception"); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 362, 157 A.2d
497, 502 (1960) ("Medical authorities recognize that before birth an infant
is a distinct entity, and ...
the law recognizes that rights which he will enjoy when born can be violated before his birth").
32. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
33. Id. at 421, 201 A.2d at 538.
34. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.

legislature may lack the power to confer upon the fetus the right
to life. The court ruled that:
We are also satisfied that the state may not require that
degree of risk involved in respondant's definition, which
would prohibit an abortion, where death from childbirth
although not medically certain, would be substantially
certain or more likely than not.8 5
This languge goes beyond a mere judicial construction of legislative intent. It reads more logically as a limitation upon the power
of the legislature to confer a right to life upon the fetus when such
right would involve a risk of death to the woman. The phrase, "or
more likely than not," raises a further question. It is unclear
whether the court is suggesting that there must be more than an
even chance of the woman surviving childbirth, or whether it is suggesting that the chances of death from childbirth may not be more
likely than the chances of death from an abortion.
If Belous intended the first interpretation, that there must be
more than an even chance of the woman surviving childbirth, the
state could confer a right to life upon the unborn child insofar as
this right does not conflict with the mother's right to life. The
balance of the two conflicting rights could be measured in terms
of the mother's chances of survival at childbirth. The woman would
be constitutionally entitled to an abortion if the risk of death
from childbirth exceeded her chances of survival therefrom. This
test is sound. The law has never treated the life of the fetus as
being of the same quality as that of the mother: To kill the mother
is murder, whereas to destroy the fetus has always been regarded
as the lesser offense of abortion. 6 The right to life of the fetus
would, however, remain superior to less compelling interests of the
mother, such as convenience.
If the second construction was intended, that the chances of
death from childbirth may not be more likely than the chances of
death from an abortion, the court has, in effect, eliminated the
interest of the unborn child as a factor in deciding whether the
mother has a right to an abortion. The following hypothetical illustrates the significance of this construction. M, who is pregnant,
has X disease. According to best medical estimates, M's chances
of not surviving an abortion are placed at one in ten thousand.
Childbirth would reduce M's chances of survival in half. The
state could not prohibit an abortion. The court, then, would have
deprived the legislature of the right to confer a right to life upon
the fetus.
There is a strong controversy surrounding the human status
of the unborn child as to the time this entity becomes human and
, 458 P.2d 194, 203, 80 Cal.
Cal. 2d
,
35. People v. Belous,
U.S. (1970).
Rptr. 354, 363 (1969) (emphasis added), cert. denied,
36. See statutes cited note 5 supra.
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thereby entitled to legal protection. Some authorities maintain
that human status is conferred at the moment the egg unites with
the sperm creating a separate biological entity with unique genetic
traits.87 Others assert that the fetus does not become human
until it is either viable or born. 88 The question of when a fetus
is "human" is one that cannot be determined by medical science.
The criteria for ascertaining humanity are cultural and philosophical. They are incapable of verification or refutation by empirical
knowledge. When an entity becomes human is largely a matter
of when the community decides, based upn its subjective feelings,
that such entity is human. If the court declares as a matter of
law that the legislature cannot confer a human status upon a
fetus, it is stating that the evidence is so strong that the fetus does
not become a person until it is born that there is no basis for the
legislature finding otherwise. The court would become the sole
arbiter of the moment of human existence. If the fetus were
deemed human from the moment of conception, it reasonably follows that its right to life would be superior to every interest of the
mother except her right to life. Insofar as Belous intended to
remove from the legislature the power to determine the moment
of humanity, the decision rests on doubtful grounds.
The Belous court also found that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. First, because the only constitutionally acceptable
application of the statute could not be reasonably derived from
the requirement that the abortion must be necessary to save the
life of the woman, 9 and second, the uncertainty inherent in such a
requirement gives a physician a compelling interest in deciding
against an abortion in those cases where a woman may have been
entitled to one. 40 The first reason is consistent with the premise
that the state does not have an interest in the unborn child either
because it lacked the power to assert such an interest or merely
never intended to exercise such power. Under such circumstances
the sole permissible prohibition upon abortion would be a test
involving only the interest of the mother. Such a test would be
confined to balancing the risk of death from abortion against the
chances of survival at childbirth. The statute does not readily
lend itself to such an interpretation. A more reasonable construction of the statute is that it permits abortions only when there is a
37. BYnN, Abortion in Perspective, 5 DUQUESNE L. REv. 120 (1966-67).
38. For a debate on the humanity of the fetus see O'Connor, On Humanity and Abortion, 13 NATURAL L. FoRUM 127 (1968); Noonan, Deciding
Who is Human, 13 NATURAL L. FORUM 134 (1968).
, 458 P.2d
,80 Cal. Rptr. 357.
39.
Cal. 2d
, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
40. Id. at
, 458 P.2d at

certainty or a substantial risk of death to the mother. Belous
has found both of these conditions to be unconstitutional limitations upon the rights of the woman. The problem arises insofar
as it is conceded that the state intended to exercise an interest in the
fetus. The problem exists because the court never unequivocally
limited its finding of no state interest in the fetus to a failure
of legislative intent. The court, in fact, used language4 ' which
casts doubt upon the right of the legislature to confer a right to
life in the fetus.
The significance of the second reason advanced by the court
for finding the statute vague is that it would provide a basis for
voiding the statute even if it were found that the state has a
compelling interest in the life of the unborn child. The court
stated that the uncertainty as to what is permissible in the name
of saving the mother's life requires the physician to act at his
peril if he decides that an abortion is justified.42 Such an impediment would have the practical result of denying a woman an
abortion when she would be entitled to one within the meaning of
the statute. It is questonable whether this basis for finding the
statute vague is tenable in light of the holding of the same court
in People v. Abarbanel.43 This case held that criminal intent was
necessary to support a conviction for criminal abortion. 44 The state
must prove as part of its case that the abortion was performed for a
purpose other than to save the life of the woman. 46 The factual situation in Abarbanel demonstrates the liberality with which the
courts have construed the statute. Diana visited two Gynecologists. One found nothing unusual about her behaviour, while the
other found her despondent. Diane testified that she was in good
health and that her mental attitude was good. She also visited
a psychiatrist, Dr. Soloman, who wrote a letter to the defendant
saying that, in his opinion, interruption of the pregnancy was necessary to save Diana's life from the possibility of suicide. Abarbanel, the defendant, said he would take the case if Wilkins, another
psychiatrist, would concur in Soloman's findings. Wilkins did.
The jury found Abarbanel guilty of a violation of the abortion
statute. 46 The conviction was reversed on the grounds that the
state did not prove the requisite criminal intent. 47 Most states
which have judicially construed the phrase, "unless necessary to

41.

Id. at

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at
,458 P.2d at
,80 Cal. Rptr. 366.
239 Cal. App. 2d 31, 48 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1965).
Id. at 34, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
Id. at 34, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
Id. at 35, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
Id. at 32, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 339.

,458

P.2d at

,80

Cal. Rptr. at 363.

Recent Cases
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

preserve her life, 4 have adopted the standard of State v. Powers4 9
which exonerates the physician if, in performing the operation, he
acts in accordance with standards approved by those reasonably
skilled in the profession. In effect, these states, including California, have made good faith the standard by which to judge the
conduct of the physician. The jury is not second-guessing the medical judgment of the doctor under this interpretation. The jury
is limited to determining the motive for which the abortion was
performed. The jury must find from the facts that, beyond reasonable doubt, the doctor performed the abortion for a purpose
other than to save the life of the woman. Such a construction
would remove any uncertainty likely to be detrimental to either
the liberty of the doctor or the health of the woman.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the court was correct in
finding that the original purpose for enacting the statute was to
protect the health of the woman and that a test that would fulfill
this purpose could not be reasonably construed from the wording
of the statute. It follows, therefore that the statute is an unconstitutional infringement upon a right, since the valid purpose for
restricting this right no longer applies. The scope of the court's
ruling in Belous is unclear. The decision contains indications,
nowhere precisely defined, that the state is very restricted in the
quantum of rights it may grant the fetus. The ruling also indicates
that, in any event, the only test sufficiently precise to avoid the
fatal defect of vagueness is a relative safety test involving solely
the interests of the woman. It is doubtful that a court will ever
have to expressly balance the conflicting rights of mother and
fetus to declare the typical abortion statute unconstitutional. Most
abortion statutes, like California's, could probably be voided
on the ground that they no longer serve their original purpose to
protect the life of the woman. A rigid test of the right to life of the
fetus, alluded to in Belous, would only be likely to occur if a legislature were to re-enact a substantially similar abortion statute,
specifically conferring upon the fetus a right to life. It is submitted that the Belous holding would be less tenable if it were applied
to such a statute.
EDWARD C. HUSSIE
48. See, e.g., State v. Dunklebarger, 286 Iowa 971, 221 N.W. 592
(1928); State v. Rudman, 126 Me. 177, 136 A. 817 (1927); Comm. v. Wheeler,
318 Mass. 394, 53 N.E.2d 4 (1944); State v. Power, 155 Wash. 63, 283 P.
439 (1929).
49. 155 Wash. 63, 283 P. 439 (1929). See also State v. Dunklebarger,
286 Iowa 971, 221 N.W. 592 (1928); Comm. v. Wheeler, 318 Mass. 394, 53
N.E.2d 4 (1944). Contra, State v. Rudman, 126 Me. 177, 136 A. 817 (1927).

JUVENILE COURT-CERTIFICATION OF CASES TO A
DISTRICT ATTORNEY ARE INTERLOCUTORY
ORDERS

Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 435 Pa. 96, 254 A.2d 639 (1969).

On July 3, 1968, Kenneth McIntyre, a juvenile, was charged
with murder before a Philadelphia magistrate who transferred him
to the custody of the juvenile court. As a result of a hearing held
on January 27 and February 3, 1969, it was determined that a
prima facie case had been presented against McIntyre, and appellant was certified by the juvenile court judge to the district attorney for transfer to criminal court. Appellant petitioned for rehearing under section 15 of the Juvenile Court Act of 19331 which
provides:
Within twenty-one (21) days after the final order of
any judge of the juvenile court, committing or placing
any dependent, neglected, or delinquent child, such child
shall, as a matter of right, by his or her parent or parents,
or next friend, have the right to present to the court a petition to have his or her case or cases reviewed or reheard if,
in the opinion of such parent, parents, or next friend, an
error of fact or of law, or of both, has been made in such
proceedings or final order, or if the2 said order has been
improvidently or inadvertently made.
The petition was dismissed, rehearing was refused and appeal
was made to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on May 9, 1969.
The court held such an order by a juvenile court a pre-trial interlocutory order, and therefor not appealable.3 The court arrived at
its conclusion by determining that such an order is not ".

.

. a final

order... committing or placing any... delinquent child," within
the meaning of section 15, and for this reason not appealable.
Appeal from orders of the juvenile courts has generally been
held to be a matter of right.4 In re Homes5 stated that the actions
of juvenile courts were always subject to appellate review for
abuse of discretion or errors of law.6 Addressing itself specifically
to the subject of transfers between juvenile and criminal courts,
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

PA. STAT. ANw. tit. 11, § 257 (1965).
Id.
Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 435 Pa. 96, 254 A.2d 639 (1969).
In re Weintraub, 166 Pa. Super. 342, 71 A.2d 823 (1959).
175 Pa. Super. 137, 103 A.2d 455 (1954).
Id. at 146, 103 A.2d at 459.
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Commonwealth v. PouIs 7 held that such transfers were subject to
review for gross abuse of discretion.8 Furthermore, In re Jenkinso
held that such a right to review and rehearing is mandated by
section 15 which specifically requires that the review and rehearing be held ". . . if in the opinion of such parent, parents, or next
friend, an error of fact or of law, or of both has been made. . . or
if the said order has been improvidently made."' 0
However, in Riggins' Case"' the court quashed an appeal by
the Commonwealth from a decision of a magistrate, sitting as a
juvenile court judge, wherein a defendant was discharged. 1 2 The
court in Riggins relied primarily on McNair's Petition, 3 a 1936 decision upon an appeal from the Mayor of Pittsburgh prohibiting
a grand jury investigation of magistrates in that city. The Supreme Court in Riggins stated that there is a long history of such
orders being held interlocutory. 14 However, neither the decision
itself nor a search of case law since McNair reveals the basis for
this statement.
In holding such a certification to be an interlocutory order,
McIntyre cites Jenkins5 to support the contention that the right
of appeal should be granted only when the order of the juvenile
court judge reflects an exericse of discretion.' 6 McIntyre also
relies in part on Gaskin's Case. 17 This decision, however, involved
an appeal by the Commonwealth on a question of law.18 Furthermore, since Gaskin arose out of an incident occurring in Philadelphia, it can only be cited to support the rule that if the Commonwealth has made out a prima facie case of murder against a juvenile defendant who is under the jurisdiction of the County Court
of Philadelphia,the juvenile court judge must certify the case to
the district attorney for further criminal proceedings.' 9 It should
further be noted that Justice Roberts' opinion makes no mention
7. 198 Pa. Super. 595, 182 A.2d 261 (1962).
8. Id. at 603, 182 A.2d at 264.
9. 210 Pa. Super. 501, 234 A.2d 49 (1967).
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 257 (1965).
11. 435 Pa. 321, 254 A.2d 616 (1969).
12. Id. at 323, 254 A.2d at 617.
13. 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498 (1936).
14. 435 Pa. at 324, 254 A.2d at 618.
15. 210 Pa. Super. 501, 234 A.2d 49 (1967).
16. 435 Pa. at 98, 254 A.2d at 641.
17. 430 Pa. 298, 244 A.2d 662 (1968).
18. Id. at 305, 244 A.2d at 666.
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 694 (1962). This section specifically exempts cases alleging murder from the jurisdiction of the County Court of
Philadelphia. However, no such exemption appears in the Juvenile Court
Act of 1933.

of Riggins, or McNair, the case upon which Riggins so heavily relied.
In effect, McIntyre has turned away from the rationale of
Riggins. In its place, Justice Roberts bases the decision squarely
on statutory interpretation. The opinion states that the language of
section 15 of the Juvenile Court Act refers to an order of the
juvenile court which places a defendant in a home or in an institution,20 and that, in any case, such a certification is not a final
order within the meaning of the statute. 21 Justice Roberts states
that:
...the rationale behind allowing the juvenile a rehearing
as of right under 11 P.S. 257 rests largely on the need for
careful discretionary action by the juvenile court in "placing" the juvenile in a way 22which serves the best interests of
both the child and society.
The broad scope of the decision, which holds such orders to be
pre-trial interlocutory orders and not appealable, overlooks several
important factors. There is no comparable provision in the Juvenile Court Act 2 3 mandating a transfer to criminal court of a
defendant against whom a prima facie case of murder has been
presented.2 4 The decision to certify a case to the district attorney
2 5
rests solely within the discretion of the juvenile court judge.
Furthermore, since such a transfer terminates proceedings under
and the applicability of this act, 26 it is somewhat difficult to agree
with Justice Roberts' argument that such a transfer does not
amount to a final order within the meaning of section 15. In addition, while the defendant is not placed in an institution as a result
of such order, he is certainly "committed" to the jurisdiction of a
court of common pleas for criminal prosecution, a potentially far
more serious disposition.
In re Gault 27 has placed heavy emphasis upon formality of
proceedings in juvenile court hearings and the protection of constitutional rights under the fouteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution. The Juvenile Court Act grants exclusive
jurisdiction to the juvenile courts in ". . . all proceedings affecting
...delinquent children. '2 The decision to deprive a juvenile de20. 435 Pa. at 98, 254 A.2d at 641.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243 et seq. (1962).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 260 (1962) states that a juvenile court

judge may certify a case before him to the district attorney ". . . if in
his opinion the interests of the state require," and if the offense alleged is
punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary: In re Mont, 175 Pa. Super.
150, 103 A.2d 460 (1954).

25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 260 (1962).
26. Id. The section states that ". . . the district attorney shall pro-

ceed with the case .

.

had never attached."
27.

28.

. as though the jurisdiction of the juvenile court

387 U.S. 1 (1967).
tit. 11, § 244 (1965).

PA. STAT. ANN.
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fendant of the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is an extremely crucial one. Resulting criminal prosecution and sentencing are likely
to affect the constitutional rights of the defendant far more seriously than a disposition by the juvenile court. For these reasons
it is submitted that to so deprive a defendant of his rights under
an act created for his benefit is neither in the best interest of the
child or society.
PHmP R. MANN

WARRANTIES-ACCRUAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN BREACH OF
WARRANTY ACTIONS
Mendel v. PittsburghPlate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207,
305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
The Court of Appeals of New York State' recently held that
the cause of action for an alleged breach of warranty relating to
the installation of glass doors was governed by a six-year contract
statute of limitations, which began to run at the time of sale rather
than by the three-year tort statute which would have commenced
2
to run at the time of injury.
On October 29, 1965, Mrs. Cecile Mendel opened, and was entering through, one of the entrance doors leading into the premises
of the Central Trust Company from the public street, when the
door through which she was walking struck her, causing her to
fall to the ground and sustain personal injuries. The glass door
which struck Mrs. Mendel was one of eight glass doors delivered
to an installed in the Central Trust Building in Rochester, New
York, by the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, in October, 1958. 3
The Mendels brought suit against both the Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Company and the Central Trust Company. They alleged four
causes of action. 4 The third and fourth causes of action, seeking
recovery for personal injuries and consequential damages, were
based upon an alleged breach of an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular use. Early in 1967, defendant Central Trust Company's motion to dismiss the third and fourth causes of action was
granted. No appeal was taken from this decision. In August,
1967, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company's motion to dismiss these
1. The decision was split 4-3 with Judges Scileppi, Jasen, Burke and
Bergan affirming the lower court decision. Judges Breitel, Fuld and
Gibson dissented.
2. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d
207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
3. As a result of the date of installation of the glass doors, October,
1958, the sale was not governed by the four-year statute of limitations
described by section 2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The application of the four-year statute of limitations began in New York State
after September 27, 1964.

4. The first and second causes of action, based on negligence, sought

recovery for Mrs. Mendel's personal injuries and Mr. Mendel's deriva-

tive consequential damages. These two actions were not involved in this
appeal and are to be defended on the merits by both the defendants, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company and Central Trust Company.
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two causes of action was also granted. 5 The ruling was affirmed
unanimously by the supreme court, appellate division 6 and appealed
once more by the Mendels.
The question presented was what was the applicable statute
of limitations to the causes of action based upon the alleged breach
of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The
New York Court of Appeals held that the six-year contract statute
of limitations 7 applied to the factual situation and that the cause
of action accrued at the time of the sale by Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Company to the Central Trust Company. This decision was in
substantial accord with an earlier New York case, Blessington v.
McCrory Stores Corp.," where the court applied the six-year contract statute of limitations to a similar situation saying:
[A]lthough such a breach of duty may rest upon, or be
associated with, a tortious act, it is independent of negligence, and so such a cause of action gets the benefit of the
six-year limit . . . as being on an implied contract obligation or liability . . . . [W]hile an action for breach of a

statutorily implied warranty of fitness may involve, incidentally, some showing of negligence, the contract
breached is not merely one to use due care, but is a
separate (implied) contract of guaranty that the goods are
fit for the purpose for which they are sold and bought.9
Breach of warranty, thus, is given the strict interpretation of being
solely a contract action having no connection with negligence or
any of the traditional tort concepts. For this reason, any breach
of warranty action is governed by contract principles and will be
controlled by the six-year statute of limitations commencing at
the time of sale.
The court in Mendel noted that although privity of contract has
been eliminated in breach of implied warranty action,' 0 this fact
does not withdraw the action from contract principles. The court
was unwilling to permit strangers to the contract to have the
5. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 57 Misc. 2d 45, 291 N.Y.S.2d
94 (1968).
6. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 29 App. Div. 2d 918, 239
N.E.2d 225, 290 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1968).
7. CPLR 213, subd. 2.
8. 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
9. Id. at 147, 111 N.E.2d at 422-23.
10. 25 N.Y.2d 340, 343, 253 N.E.2d 207, 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 493 (citing
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963), and distinguishing it on the basis that while it mentioned strict tort liability, it did not create a tort action, and stating that
Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953), is
controlling).

benefit of a three-year-from-the-time-of-injury tort rule.1
Such a rule . . . would create the anomalous situation of

possibly giving greater rights to the stranger than to the
immediate purchaser. To illustrate: A, the driver and
purchaser, and B, the passenger, are both personally injured in an automobile accident caused by a manufacturing
defect. If the statute of limitations has already run on
the warranty action, then the purchaser would be relegated to a possible action in negligence whereas the passenger could still sue and recover
by merely showing the
2
defect and the resulting injury.'
The majority gave no reason why affected parties should not have
both the contract and tort causes of action available to them. It
presumed, however, that any injury caused by a defective product,
13
years after its manufacture, is due to operation and maintenance.
Such a presumption is contrary to the theory of strict liability in
tort. Plaintiff's, in suits brought under the strict liability tort
concept, still have the burden of showing that the defect in the
product was due to its original manufacturing and that the resultant injury was proximately caused by the defect. 14 To conclusively presume this heavy burden against a plaintiff is to force
upon him the even more difficult burden of proving negligence.
Such a situation is precisely the reason for the development of the
concept of strict liability in tort. To force a plaintiff to come
under the contract statute of limitations or prove negligence as to
manufacture and installation is tantamount to precluding a cause
of action in the present situation.
The true nature of the breach of warranty action has been
subject to much controversy and has had a confusing history.' 5
Recently, however, a number of courts,' 6 in dispensing with the
privity requirement have imposed strict tort liability on the theory
that the cost of injuries resulting from defective products are
11. CPLR 214, subd. 5.
12. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 343, 253
N.E.2d 207, 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 493 (1969).
13. Id. at 345, 253 N.E.2d at 211, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
14. Id. at 349, 253 N.E.2d at 213, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 499 (dissenting
opinion).
15. The scope of liability for personal injuries and property damage, first in negligence and most recently in strict product liability,
has developed beyond the parties in contractual privity, without an
accompanying development in analysis or terminology beyond that
of warranty, third-party beneficiaries, and privity. In consequence,
contract and tort law have been confused. From this comes the
paradox that there can be no strict liability without "warranty"
... and strict liability is to be determined to some extent by
"warranty" law, that is. contract law.
Id. at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 211, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 496 (dissenting opinion). See
generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 800-805 (1966).
16. For a comprehensive analysis of the development, see Jaeger,
Privity of Warranty: Has The Tocsin Sounded?, 1 DUQUESNE U. L. REv. 1
(1963). See also Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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17
borne best by the manufacturers rather than the injured persons.
The concept of strict liability in tort, although new, has had rapid
acceptance.'" A case distinguished by the New York Court of
Appeals in Mendel, Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,' 9
stated:
A breach of warranty, it is now clear, is not only a violation of the sales contract out of which the warranty arises,
but is a tortious wrong usable by a noncontracting party
whose use of the warranted article is within the
20 reasonable
contemplation of the vendor or manufacturer.
The Restatement,21 in its definition of warranty, states that liability under section 402A does not rest upon negligence but rather
strict liability based purely in tort.
Although warranty was in its origin a matter of tort liability and it is generally agreed that a tort action will
still lie for its breach, it has become so identified in prac-

tice with a contract of sale . . . that the warranty theory

has become something of an obstacle to the recognition
of strict liability where there is no such contract . . .[I]t
should be recognized and understood that the "warranty"
is a very different kind of warranty from those usually
found in the sale of goods, and that it is not subject to the
various contract
rules which have grown up to surround
22
such sales.
The concept of warranty, in reference to defective products, thus
takes on a new meaning separate from the old concept of an
agreement between the seller and his immediate buyer. The liability which attaches to this new meaning is simply stated by a
Restatement as being one of strict liability in tort, the breach
thereof being a breach of this strict liability in tort.
Various state courts have dealt with the question of whether
17. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 60, 377 P.2d
897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
18. See generally, 2 FURMER AND FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A,
Par. 3 (1966); 2 HARPER AND JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 238 (1968).
19. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
20. Id. at 434, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
21. The Restatement, text writers and a number of courts have recognized that strict liability is based in tort and not in contract. See, e.g.,
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963); Howe v. Pioneer Mfg. Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 330, 338-40,
68 Cal. Rptr. 617, 622-23 (1968); Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51
N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968); Wilsey v. Mulkey Co., 56 Misc. 2d 480, 289
N.Y.S.2d 307 (1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m (1965).

contract or tort principles should apply to a product liability case
and have decided in favor of the application of a tort statute of
28
limitations.
24
The landmark case, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.
spoke in terms of a breach of implied warranty when it held a
manufacturer accountable for injuries proximately resulting from
a defective product, despite absence of privity or showing of negligence. Although the decision was in terms of contracts and privity,
thus calling for the application of the contract statute of limitations,
the pendulum has swung, and tort principles are now being applied. 25 Likewise, the supreme court of New Jersey held in Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick,26 a property damage case involving
water meters causing damage fourteen years after installation
and twenty-two years after sale, that tort and not contract limitations applied, and that, therefore, the cause of action accrued from
the date of injury. In handling this case, the court reversed the
holding of the lower appeallate courts which had concluded that,
if the wrong was treated as a tort for purposes of limitations, the
although the purchaser similarly
chance user might have a remedy
2T
injured would be time-barred.
The dissent in Mendl, citing Rosenau, felt that it is not clear
that the purchaser because of his contract could be precluded
from pursuing an alternative remedy in tort accruing at the time
of injury. 28 There seems to be no reason to forbid a purchaser from
having a choice of remedies, depending upon when the injury occurs.
It is submitted that, despite the anomalous situation created
by permitting a stranger to a contract to bring suit based on
strict tort liability while the purchaser is barred by a statute of
limitations, the requirement that the stranger be governed by the
contract statute of limitations is untenable. To require that a person sue for an injury before it occurs and be barred from a recovery based upon strict tort liability is far from just.
The manufacture of a defective product which causes physical
injury is something which cannot be condoned and the fact that the
defect does not become noticeable or cause injury before the six23. See note 19 supra.
24. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
25. The warranty which is breached is not the old sales warranty
nor the warranty covered by the Uniform Sales Act or the Uniform Commercial Code. It is not a warranty of the seller to the buyer, it is something separate and distinct which sounds in tort exclusively, not in contract, which exists apart from any contracts, and which creates a strict
liability in tort. See generally Prosser, Spectacular Change: Products
Liability in General,36 CLEVELAND B.A.J. 149, 167-68 (1965).
26. 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968).
27. 93 N.J. Super. 49. 224 A.2d 689 (1968).
28. 25 N.Y.2d 340, 347, 253 N.E.2d 207, 212-13, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 498
(1969) (dissenting opinion).
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year contract statute of limitations or four-year Uniform Commerical Code statute of limitations2 9 expires should not be permitted to nullify a meritorious claim. Strict liability in tort was
designed to administer to the problem of personal injuries, not
to supplant the warranty provisions of the Sales Act or of the
Uniform Commercial Code. 0 The breach of implied warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code" ' adequately compensate
the purchaser; however, products are designed to function safely
for periods longer than the period for which the statute of limitations provides and both the chance user and customer must be
provided with recourse against manufacturers of defective products. In light of the fact that courts have not precluded plaintiffs
32
it
from pursuing both contract and tort remedies alternatively,
is submitted that in cases in which the Uniform Commercial Code
does not apply, the now inadequate contract thinking should be
augmented with the concept of strict liability in tort, and an injured party should be afforded use of the three-year-from-time-ofinjury tort statute of limitations.
FRANCIs A. MONTBACH

29.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725 (1962).

30. See Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d
305 (1965).
31. UNIFOM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 (1962).
32. See, e.g., Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111
N.E.2d 421 (1953); Durant v. Grange Silo Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 694, 207
N.Y.S.2d 691 (1960).

TESTING LABORATORIES-LIABILITY TO
CONSUMERS FOR NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION

Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 1 Cal. App. 3d 149, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519
(1969).
This is Good Housekeeping's Consumers' Guaranty Seal.
We satisfy ourselves that the products advertised in Good
Housekeeping are good ones and that the advertising
claims made for them in our magazine are truthful .... 1
Every day American consumers rely on such endorsements in
purchasing a multitude of different products. The effects of testing laboratory endorsements in inducing the public to buy products
which have obtained their approval are far reaching and the economic gain derived by those who endorse these products is great.
Aware of the above considerations, the California Court of Appeals
has held in Hanberry v. Hearst Corp.2 that testing laboratories may

be liable for negligent misrepresentation 8 to a purchaser who, re-

lying on the endorsement, buys the product and is injured because
4
it is defective and not as represented in the endorsement.
The plaintiff in Hearst purchased a pair of shoes, imported and
distributed by the defendant, Victor B. Handal and Bros., Inc.
She contended that in buying the shoes, she was relying on an advertisement which incorporated the contents of the Good Housekeeping endorsement. 5 She further alleged that it was her belief
that the products bearing the seal had been tested and inspected
by the magazine and found to be safe for their intended use.
Immediately after the purchase and while wearing the shoes
in question, the plaintiff stepped on the vinyl floor of her kitchen,
slipped, fell and sustained severe injuries. She brought causes of
action against the shoe store, the distributor and Hearst Corporal. GOOD HOUSEKEEPiNc, April, 1968, at 6.
2. 1 Cal. App. 3d 149, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969).
3. The plaintiff also brought causes of action based upon breach of
warranty, strict liability and alleged conspiracy between Hearst Corporation and the other defendants to sell the product through false representation. The warranty and strict liability actions were rejected by the
court of appeals, who refused to extend either theory of recovery to one not
directly involved in the manufacturing or distributing process. The conspiracy allegation was dropped on appeal.
4. 1 Cal. App. 3d 149, 151, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521 (1969).
5. A manufacturer or distributor who advertises in Good Housekeeping and obtains its consumer seal is granted the opportunity of using the
seal in other publications in the advertising media.
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6
tion, publisher of Good Housekeeping, alleging that the soles of
the shoes were defective in design and manufactured of a material
which had a low co-efficient of friction on vinyl and other floor coverings, making it extremely hazardous to walk upon such surfaces.
She further alleged that in issuing it's seal, Hearst made no test or
examination of the product or, if such tests were made, they were
done in a negligent manner.
Although there have been only a few decisions dealing with
7
the liability of testing laboratories, discussions of the possible
basis of liability of testing laboratories have concluded that a tort
s
action for negligent misrepresentation is an appropriate remedy.
Originally, there could be no liability for negligent conduct arising
out of a contractual relationship absent privity of contract between the parties. The courts refused to recognize a duty other
9
than the one which arose by virtue of the contract. The privity
requirement was soon abandoned in cases where the product in0
volved was inherently dangerous.1 Today, privity of contract
is no longer a prerequisite to a cause of action based upon negligence." As a result of the abandonment of privity, the Hearst
6. The court of appeals dealt only with those causes of action involving Hearst Corporation.
7. See, Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F. Supp.
109 (D. Del. 1967) (upholding a cause of action against Underwriters Laboratories for negligent inspection of a fire extinguisher, held to be an inherently dangerous product); National Iron & Steel Co. v. Hunt, 312 Ill. 245,
143 N.E. 833 (1924), overruled in Rozney v. Marnal, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d
656 (1969), (dismissing a cause of action by a purchaser of iron rails
against an inspector because of the absence of privity of contract).
8. See 53 IA. L. REv. 772 (1967); 36 NoTRE DAME LAW. 176 (1961);
Note, Tort Liability of Independent Testing Agencies, 22 RUTGERs L. REV.
299 (1968); Comment, Potential Liability of Non-Manufacturer Certifiers of
Quality, 10 VILL. L. REV. 708 (1965); 1964 WASH. U. L.Q. 77 (1964).
9. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1880); Winterbottom v.
Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
10. See Dickerson v. Shepard Warner Elevator Co., 287 F.2d 255 (6th
Cir. 1961); Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109
(D. Del. 1967); McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, Ill N.E. 1050
(1916); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
11. See Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
The determination of whether in a specific case the defendant is
liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and
involves the balancing of various factors, among which are the
extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct and the policy of preventing future harm.
Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19; accord, Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan
Assn., 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609 (1968); Rozney v. Marnal, 43 Ill. 2d

court, relying on public policy, imposed a duty upon the publishing
company to use ordinary care so that those who rely on its endorsement in purchasing products are not unreasonably exposed
12
to the risk of harm.
Since the Hearst case dealt with negligent misrperesentation
involving personal injuries, the court was able to rely upon section
311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which provides:
(1) one who negligently gives false information to another
is subject to liability for physical harm caused by action
taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such information where such harm results
(a) to the other or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect
to be put in peril by the action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise
reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated. 13
The court held that under the provisions of section 311, if it
can be shown that Good Housekeeping failed to detect the defective design of the shoes because of a negligent examination of the
product, it will be held liable for the injuries sustained by the
plaintiff. 14 The failure to detect the defect exposes the consuming public, the intended recipients of the endorsement, to risk of
harm from slipping upon floor surfaces. 15 Furthermore, section
311 would provide a basis of liability wherever failure to make an
adequate inspection of a product resulted in physical injury to a
consumer who relied upon the tester's representation in purchasing
the product.
The question remains as to whether the testing laboratory can
be held liable for negligent misrepresentation which results only
in financial loss to the purchaser. Courts have traditionally limited
the class of persons who can recover when intangible economic interests are invaded. 16 The leading case concerning limitation of
liability when only financial loss is incurred is Utramares Corp. v.
Touche.17 In that case, Justice Cardozo expressed his awareness
54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969); Ryan v. Kanne,
Iowa
, 170 N.W.2d 395
(1969).
12. 1 Cal. App. 3d 149, 152, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 522. See generally Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Assn., 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609
(1968), 73 Cal. Rptr. 369; Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256,
391 P.2d 168 (1964), 37 Cal. Rptr. 896; Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal. 2d 552, 375
P.2d 304, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1962).
13. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965).
14. 1 Cal. App. 3d 149, 153, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 523.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Talpey v. Wright, 61 Ark. 275, 32 S.W. 1072 (1895);
Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783 (1919); Howell v. Betts, 211
Tenn. 134, 362 S.W.2d 924 (1962); Peterson v. Gales, 191 Wis. 137, 210 N.W.
407 (1926).
17. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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of the existence of potential "liability in an indeterminate amount
for an indeterminable time to an indeterminable class"' 8 The possible liability which may result from the communication of a statement to remote plaintiffs may be out of proportion to the fault
involved. 19 Liability has been found in those cases where (1) the
defendant makes representations directly to the plaintiff, 20 (2) the
representation is exhibited to the plaintiff by the defendant with
knowledge that he intends to rely upon it,21 or (3) the representation is made to a third person with knowledge that he intends to
communicate to the specific individual plaintiff for the purpose of
inducing him to act.2 2 It has been held, however, that mere foreseeability that the representations will be communicated to others
whose identity is unknown to the defendant is not sufficient to
impose liability.23 Only a few decisions have allowed recovery
by a foreseeable class of plaintiffs without advance identification of
24
the particular plaintiff to the defendant.
The American Law Institute has drafted section 552 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts2 5 in an effort to define an accept18. Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444.
19. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 102, at 721 (3d ed. 1964).
20. International Products Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E.
662 (1927).
21. Decatur Land, Loan & Abstract Co. v. Rutland, 185 S.W. 1064 (Tex.
Ct. Civ. App. 1916).
22. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). See also
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 102 at 721-22 (3d ed. 1964).
23. American Cas. Co. v. Memorial Hospital Ass'n., 223 F. Supp. 539
(E.D. Wis. 1963).
24. Compare Texas Tunneling Co. v. Chattanooga, 329 F.2d 402 (1964),
with M. Miller Co. v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary District, 198 Cal. App.
2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1962).
See also Granberg v. Turnham, 166 Cal.
App. 2d 390, 333 P.2d 423 (1958).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12)
(1966):
(1) one who, in the course of his business profession or employment, or a transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest supplies
false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by
their justifiable reliance upon such information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence, in obtaining or communicating
the information.
(2) except as stated in subsection (3) the liability stated in subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of the persons for whose benefit
and guidance he knows the information to be intended
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction which he intends the information to influence, or knows that the recipient
so intends, or in a substantially similar transaction.
(3)
The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the
information extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons
for whose benefit the duty is created in any of the transactions in
which it is intended to protect them.

able extension of liability in cases involving damage to intangible
interests. Under the provisions of section 552(2) (b), liability arises
when the financial loss is suffered through reliance upon the misrepresentation in a transaction which the declarant intends the
information to influence. Since the primary motive of product
endorsements is to induce the public, through advertisements of
that endorsement, to purchase the product, it is submitted that
section 552(2) (b) is a possible source of liability where financial
loss is incurred.
It would seem incongruous to allow testing laboratories to
escape liability for pecuniary loss simply by disseminating their
endorsements through the mass media to such a large group of
consumers that it becomes impossible to ascertain the identity of
any individual consumer who will rely upon the certification. The
party making the representation may authorize its communication
to one person or to an entire class, and its liability should vary
accordingly. 26
If liability based upon negligent misrepresentation is imposed
upon product endorsers, attempts to limit their liability by statements in their certification must fail. 27 In Hearst the court held
that the defendant is still subject to full liability for injury resulting from tortious negligent misrepresentation regardless of the
"contractual obligation" it may have assumed in its seal. 28
Good Housekeeping does not certify that certain characteristics
of the produce meet its standards; it instead states that it is satisfied that the products advertised are "good ones." Thus, it was
contended by Hearst Corporation that its representation was one
of opinion and could not be the inducing factor in bringing about
the sale. 29 However, the seal itself contains no expression of
opinion. The Hearst court found that the seal is given to the
product for the sole purpose of inducing the public to buy the
product.3 0 The court stated that Good Housekeeping represents to
the public that it is a disinterested third party who has tested
the product to assure the consumer that the product is sufficient
for its intended use.3 ' It further impliedly represents that it has
special knowledge concerning the product and is protecting the
interests of the consumer.3 2 Under these circumstances the
Hearst court held that a testing agency could be liable for misrep26.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 552, com-

ment h at 23 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).
27. Cf. Woodruff & Sons v. Brown, 256 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1958); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168 (1964), 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896.
28. 1 Cal. App. 3d 149, 153, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 523 (1969) (Good House-

keeping's seal guarantees only replacement or refund to the consumer).
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
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resentations of either fact or opinion. 8 As professional advisors,
testing agencies have a duty to present correct statements and
give sound advice.a4 They should not be allowed to escape liability by contending that the advice would, except for their professional status, be regarded as opinion.
Liability for negligent misrepresentation to consumers must
be limited in its application to those testing laboratories which
publicly endorse the product and allow the manufacturer to use the
testing laboratory's endorsement in advertisements of the product.3 5 The duty of care attributable to the testing laboratory can
not extend beyond the intended recipients of the information.3 6
If the purpose of the testing agency is to divulge the results of its
test only to the manufacturer, it should not be held liable if a consumer, who has obtained possession of the information, relies upon
it to his financial detriment.
The burden of proof upon the injured party in an action based
upon negligent misrepresentation may be difficult to sustain. The
testing laboratory does not claim to test and cannot test every
product individually. It tests a sample and awards its endorsement
based upon the characteristics of that sample. It was held in Hearst
that the injured party must prove that the defect was one in design or materials which is common to all the products manufactured, including the sample used by the testing laboratory.3 7
If the defect is unique to the particular item involved, recovery
from the testing laboratory should be denied.
If the holding in Hanberry v. Hearst Corp. is followed by
other jurisdictions, the potential liability of testing laboratories
will be great. But if testing laboratories are willing to allow
their certifications to be used in inducing consumption of the
product, they must be willing to take the responsibility of seeing
that their statements are accurate.
JAMEs A. ULSH

33. Id.; cf. Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 487, 275 P.2d 15 (1954); Haserot v. Keller, 67 Cal. App. 659, 228 P. 383 (1924); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 543 (1938).
34. See Hedin v. Minneapolis Medical & Surgical Inst., 62 Minn. 146,
64 N.W. 158 (1895); Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940);
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); Collins v.
Chipman, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 563, 95 S.W. 666 (1906).
35. See, Note, Tort Liability of Independent Testing Agencies, 22 RUTcERS L. REv. 299, 322 (1968).

36.
37.

See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
1 Cal. App. 3d 149, 154, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 524.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT-EMPLOYEE CAN SUE
FOR SUGGESTION USED BY EMPLOYER

Schott v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 436 Pa. 279, 259 A.2d
443 (1969).
In Schott v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,1 Westinghouse operated a suggestion program, inviting its employees to submit ideas
which would increase production or reduce costs. In May 1962,
plaintiff Schott submitted, on the company's form, a suggestion
that panels on the circuit breakers be made from heavy gauge
steel rather than the cast aluminum then used. The Suggestion
Committee made the final decisions on accepting or rejecting suggestions, and on the amount of the award. Schott's suggestion was
rejected on the ground that the necessary redesign would be too
expensive. In September 1963, the suggestion was resubmitted
and again rejected. Plaintiff complained that shortly thereafter
his suggestion was adopted. The company again rejected his request for reconsideration and averred that the change was the result of independent action having no relationship to plaintiff's
suggestion. Plaintiff filed suit praying for an accounting of the
savings which the company made from his suggestion and asking
damages of 20%. The trial court sustained the company's objection that no valid claim was stated, and also rejected plaintiff's
amended complaint which was based on contract and unjust enrichment theories. 2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
while the demurrer to the contract action was properly sustained,
the plaintiff should have been given an opportunity to prove his
case under an unjust enrichment cause of action.3 Justice Roberts,
joined by Justice O'Brien, concurred in the result but differed on
the theory, believing that a cause of action had been stated in
contract. 4 Chief Justice Bell dissented on the grounds that there
was no action in contract and that he opposed the use of the doctrine of unjust enrichment. 5
The contractual difficulties arose because of a clause in the
Suggestion Plan that the decision of the Suggestion Committee
1. 436 Pa. 279, 259 A.2d 443 (1969).
2. Schott v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 1903 (C.P. Allegheny,
Jan. Term, 1967).
3. Schott v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 436 Pa. 279, 289, 293-94,
259 A.2d 443, 448, 450 (1969).
4. Id. at 294, 259 A.2d at 450 (concurring opinion).
5. Id. at 296, 259 A.2d at 451 (dissenting opinion).
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"on all matters" is final.' The company argued that Schott's use
of the suggestion form provided by them created a contract binding
him to the decision of the Suggestion Committee. If an express
contract exists, the rights of the parties are strictly circumscribed
by the terms of the contract, regardless of how harsh the provisions might be.7
The majority in Schott felt that no express contract existed
since the Suggestion Committee had rejected plaintiff's suggestion. If the suggestion program was an offer of a unilateral contract, the acceptance by the plaintiff on the company's form bound
him to its terms, one of which was the necessity of approval by
the Suggestion Committee." If the suggestion was the offer, it is
clear that it was rejected by the company's committee.9 Having
eliminated any possibility of an express contract, the court used an
unjust enrichment theory of recovery. 10 Justice Roberts, on the
contrary, felt that the plaintiff could recover under a contract
theory. He reasoned that the company had, despite its formal rejection, accepted the offered suggestion by its actions in using it;
therefore there was an offer and acceptance and a contract was
formed.1'
An unjust enrichment cause of action is based on the proposition that a person who receives a benefit from someone else who
was not acting officiously and who expected to receive compensation, should not be allowed to enjoy that benefit without paying
for it. 12 If the company used the idea which it obtained from the
plaintiff, and benefited from it, it had a moral obligations to compensate him. The court in Schott believed that the plaintiff should
have an opportunity to prove that the company had used his suggestion.'8 It was apparent that the plaintiff expected to be paid if
6.

The clause is as follows:

In submitting this suggestion, I agree that the decision of the
local Suggestion Committee on all matters pertaining to this
suggestion, my eligibility for an award, if any, will be final.
I further understand that if this suggestion is rejected, I have the
right to reopen it within 12 months from the date of rejection, or
to re-submit it as a new suggestion at any time thereafter.
NOTE: If adopted; Minimum award - $5.00
Maximum award - $15,000.
Id. at 283, 259 A.2d at 445.
7. See, e.g., Third Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co.,
353 Pa. 185, 44 A.2d 571 (1945).
8. 436 Pa. 279, 287, 259 A.2d 443, 447 (1969).
9. Id. at 288, 259 A.2d at 447-48.
10. Id. at 290, 259 A.2d at 448.
11. Id. at 294-95, 259 A.2d at 450-51 (concurring opinion).
12. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 6 (1963).
13. 436 Pa. 279, 294, 259 A.2d 443, 450 (1969) (concurring opinion).

his suggestion was put into effect and resulted in savings to the
company. The court concluded that it was not evident that plaintiff acted officiously.

14

The court was not able to "conclude that

the law would not permit quasi-contractual recovery on the basis
of these facts."' 15 Justice Roberts disagreed, finding the unjust enrichment theory unacceptable. 16 The submission of the suggestion
on the company form signified an agreement to be bound by its
terms and by the decision of the Suggestion Committee on both
the acceptance of the idea and the amount of the award. This express contract would preclude the finding of a quasi-contract since
there can be no implied-in-law contract where an express contract setting forth the intentions of the parties exists.17 Plaintiff
could recover much more under a theory of quasi-contract than he
could have had his suggestion been accepted. 18 If plaintiff's suggestion had been accepted, he would have been bound by the decision of the committee which could have awarded anywhere from
$5 to $15,000.19 Under a quasi-contractual or unjust enrichment
theory there is no limit to the amount of his recovery.
The few cases on point have been decided on a contractual
basis. Osborn v. Boeing Airplane Co. 20 involved a similar provision in its suggestion plan on the finality of the company's decision. 21 The district court in Osborn held that quasi-contractual
recovery was ruled out by the wording of the suggestion form.
The court held that the plaintiff would have been bound by the
suggestion form and a reliance on the good faith of the company,
except that plaintiff had earlier submitted his proposal orally.
Because of plaintiff's previous oral submission, the suggestion form
did not bar recovery. 22 Carlini v. United States Rubber Co. 23 involved an employee who submitted three suggestions through the
company's plan, two of which had been accepted and one rejected
because it had already been under consideration. The plaintiff
claimed that the compensation was insufficient for the two accepted
suggestions, and that the third one should have been accepted. 24
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 292, 259 A.2d at 449.
Id.
Id. at 295, 259 A.2d at 451.
See, e.g., Smith v. Stovell, 256 Ia. 165, 125 N.W.2d 795 (1964); 17
Am. JUR. 2d Contracts § 3 (1964); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 6 (1963).
18. Schott v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 436 Pa. 279, 295, 259 A.2d
443, 449 (1969) (concurring opinion).
19. See note 6 supra.
20. 309 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962).
21. The provision is as follows:
Suggestions are submitted with the understanding that the
Company shall have the right to use all those which are adopted
and the decision of the Company shall be final and conclusive as
to the person entitled to a cash award and the amount of such
award.
Id. at 100.
22. Id.at 102.
23. 8 Mich. App. 501, 154 N.W.2d 595 (1967).
24. Id. at 502, 154 N.W.2d at 596. United States Rubber Company's
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The trial court had, as in Schott, entered a summary judgment on
the "basis that the decision of the Suggestion Committee in regard
to plaintiff's rewards or lack of reward was final."25 The Michigan
Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the plaintiff should have
an opportunity to discover if the Suggestion Committee acted
within its authority and in good faith. 26 Justice Roberts, in Schott,
is closer to this approach. He believes the plaintiff should be given
a chance to establish that the Westinghouse Company used his
suggestion in redesigning their circuits. Their rejection of his suggestion would not form the contract, but their actions in utilizing
27
it would.
An analogy can be drawn between the finality of the decision
of the Suggestion Committee and the finality of the decision of
judges in contests.28 A contestant must meet all the conditions of
the terms of the contest to be eligible.2 9 The decision of the contest judges can only be challenged if fraud or bad faith is present. 30 The running of the contest is in the nature of an offer.
The acceptance must conform to the offer which usually contains
the rule that the decision of the judge is final. Therefore, whoever
enters the contest is bound by the decision of the judge unless he
can prove fraud, gross mistake, or lack of good faith. 31 Similarly,
the decision of the Suggestion Committee should be founded on
good faith considerations.
In Schott, the court felt that the plaintiff should have his day
in court and be given a chance to prove a causal relationship between the submission of his idea and the company's redesign.3 2
It is more logical to argue that a contract existed which defined
the rights, liabilites, and intentions of the parties. The plaintiff
bound himself to follow the rules of the company in suggesting
improvements, one of which was the finalty of the Suggestion
Committee's decisions. The Suggestion Committee bound itself to
plan called for an "award in direct ratio to value" rather than leaving it to
the total discretion of the committee although they also provided that
the decision of the Suggestion Committee should be final.
25. Id. at 503, 154 N.W.2d at 596-97.
26. Id. at 504, 154 N.W.2d at 598.
27. Schott v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 436 Pa. 279, 294, 259 A.2d
443, 451 (1969) (concurring opinion).
28. See Carlini v. United States Rubber Co., 8 Mich. App. 501, 154
N.W.2d 595 (1967).
29. Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 649 (1963).
30. Id. at 673.
31. Endres v. Buffalo Automobile Dealers Ass'n. Inc., 29 Misc. 2d 756,
217 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Sup. Ct., Erie Co., 1961).
32. 436 Pa. 279, 294, 259 A.2d 443, 450 (1969) (concurring opinion).

act in good faith in its acceptance and rejection of suggestions. It
would be unjust to allow the company to solicit suggestions from
employees who hoped to be compensated, and then appropriate
the idea by arbitrarily rejecting the suggestion and later adopting
it as their own. It would also be unjust to allow the plaintiff to
recover more than the parties ever intended.
Under the suggestion plan, the company hoped to receive useful
suggestions. They would decide the value of the suggestion and
compensate accordingly within the limits specified by the plan.
Neither the company nor the employee ever intended that the
award would be based on the amount of savings. The suggestion
plan contained an upper limit of $15,000, yet it is obvious that a
suggestion could result in the savings to the company of much
more. The use of the contractual theory would more effectively
carry out the intentions of the parties involved, while the quasicontractual theory could go far beyond them.
JANE F. WOODSIDE
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